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ABSTRACT

The purpose of my dissertation is to challenge the mainstream
tradition of discourse in the field of international relations with regard to the world
system and gains pursuit which has been framed by two significant theoretical
perspectives: realism and neoliberalism.
In my dissertation, I established a theoretical linkage between the gains
pursuit debate and the dynamics of the world system. The problem of absolute
and relative gains divides two of the most influential approaches to international
relations theory: realism and neoliberalism. However, these dichotomized
approaches to gains pursuit assume a fixed (or static) view of the world system
based on anarchy, and do not allow an explanation of the dynamics in the world
system such as polarity change (as a form of system) or tension-détente
movement. (as an environment of system)
To explain the complexity, dynamics of system and the decision-maker’s
choice, this research suggests a synthetic approach to the issues around gains
pursuit and the change of the world system from both major perspectives
(realism and neoliberalism) of international relations.
From this point of view, this research will present a critique of past
dichotomized perspectives on gain pursuit and suggest a possibility of
reconciliation between two conflicting views in terms of the decision-makers’
sense of threat and assessment of the world system.

v

The second purpose of my dissertation is to challenge the literature of
decision-making process on the subsystem levels (states’ and decision-makers’
levels) which are based on decision-makers value systems, personalities, and
ideologies only. The decision-maker’s mind-set is crucial to understand his/her
gains pursuits. However, the mind-set must not be understood as the result of
individual personalities but as the result of the interaction between the world
system environment and the decision-maker’s assessment of the environment.
Three main questions of this research are as follows: 1) Can two
dichotomized major theoretical approaches (realism/neoliberalism) of gains
pursuit explain the whole dynamics of the world system? 2) Can the analysis
based on a typology of personality and value system provide a much richer
explanation of the decision-maker’s choice and gains pursuit? Can this approach
provide a valid explanation of the same decision-maker’s policy change? 3) Does
change of the world system influence the decision-maker’s gains pursuit? If so,
what are the major factors in the world environment which have influence on
actions around gains pursuit? What is the basic mechanism of this relationship?
Three case studies in my dissertation (Human Rights policy of the Carter
Administration, Mao and Deng’s foreign policies, decision-making of the Clinton
Administration) provide explanations for the above questions.
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Chapter I
Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to challenge the mainstream
tradition of discourse in the field of international relations with regard to the world
system and gains pursuit debate which have been framed by two significant
theoretical perspectives: neorealism and neoliberalism.
Two contemporary approaches to international relations, modern
realism (neorealism) and neoliberal insitutionalism, compete in seeking to explain
how the anarchical context of the international system inhibits joint action among
states that otherwise share common interests, and how states sometimes
overcome those inhibitions and achieve cooperation. 1
Mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship today largely
accepts fixed views about the states system and gains pursuit in foreign policy
decision-making. It is dominated by Theory of International Politics (1979),
Kenneth Waltz’s powerful statement of ‘Neorealism,’ which combines a microeconomic approach to the international system with the Classical Realist
emphasis on power and interest. According to Waltz, every state acts for its
Modern realists include Kenneth Waltz (1979), Robert Gilpin (1987), and
Stephen Krasner (1991). Neoliberal institutionalist include Arthur Stein (1984),

1
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survival with the principle of ‘self-help,’ and cooperation among nations can be
limited by awareness of ‘relative gains.’
Modern realists argue that in the context of international anarchy, states that
face mixed interests fail to cooperate because they are tempted to cheat and fear
being cheated. Moreover, according to modern realists, anarchy causes states to
worry that partners might achieve relatively greater gains from collaboration and,
thus strengthened, become more domineering friends in the present or possibly
more formidable foes in the future. Hence, modern realists have argued that
states face two barriers to cooperation: the problem of enforcement, and the
problem of relative gains.
Waltz’s book helped generate a competing theory, “Neoliberalism,” stated
most systematically by Robert Keohane (1984) in After Hegemony, which
accepted

much of Neorealism’s theoretical assumptions about the notion of

anarchy but argued that international institutions dampen, if not entirely displace,
the effects of this anarchic world. Keohane argues that the problem of cheating
can be resolved if states create international institutions that help them to work
with one another on the basis of ‘tit-fot-tat’ strategies of conditional cooperation.
Neoliberalism assumes that states focus on their individual absolute
gains and are indifferent to the gains of others. The optimistic view about
international cooperation comes from states’ absolute gains pursuit.

Charels Lipson (1984), and Robert Keohane (1984,1986) and Robert Axelrod
(1981).
2

In this study, a theoretical linkage between the gains pursuit debate and
the dynamics of the world system is established. The problem of absolute and
relative gains divides two of the most influential approaches to international
relations theory, realism and neoliberalism. However, these dichotomized
approaches to gains pursuit assume a fixed (or static) view of the world system
based on anarchy2, and do not allow an explanation of the dynamics in the world
system such as polarity change (as a form of system) or tension-détente
movement (as an environment of system).
To explain the complexity, the dynamics of the system, and the decisionmaker’s choice, this study suggests a synthetic approach to the issues around
gains pursuit and the change of the world system from both major perspectives
(neorealism and neoliberalism) of international relations.
From this point of view, this study will present a critique of past
dichotomized perspectives on gains pursuit, and suggest a possibility of
reconciliation between two conflicting views in terms of the decision-makers’
sense of threat and assessment of the world system.
The second purpose of this study is to challenge the literature on decisionmaking processes on the subsystem levels (states’ and decision-makers’ levels),
which are based on decision-makers’ value systems, personalities, and
ideologies only. The decision-maker’s mind-set is crucial to understand his/her
According to Joseph Grieco, both neorealism and neoliberalism are based on a
general state of fixed anarchy. Neither approach accounts for more dynamic
aspects of the world system such as polarity change and movement from détente

2
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gains pursuits. However, the mind-set must not be understood as the result of
individual personalities, but instead as the result of the interaction between the
world system environment and the decision-maker’s assessment of the
environment.
The main questions addressed here are as follows: 1) Can two
dichotomized major theoretical approaches (neorealism/neoliberalism) of gains
pursuit explain the whole dynamics of the world system? 2) Can the analysis
based on a typology of personalities and value systems provide a richer
explanation of the decision-maker’s choice and gains pursuit? Can this approach
provide a valid explanation of the same decision-maker’s policy change? 3) Does
change in the world system influence the decision-maker’s gains pursuit? If so,
what are the major factors in the world environment which have influence on
actions around gains pursuit? What is the basic mechanism of this relationship?

Chapter 3 will be dedicated to the construction of hypotheses
developed from the research questions. A clear explanation of how the
hypotheses are constructed (basic assumptions, variables, definitions of the
concepts I am attempting to measure) will be linked to a discussion of the
theoretical significance of my analysis.

to tension or vice versa. See Grieco, J. (1990) Cooperation among Nations.
Ithaca: Cornell Unviversity Press.
4

Several cases will be examined to understand the relationship between
the dynamics of the world system and the decision-maker’s mind-set. Chapter 4
will focus on the Carter administration. The historic events and the decisionmaker’s rhetoric which show the mechanism of the decision-making process in
the context of the world system will be discussed in the same chapter.
The case of the US is very useful for my purposes. As a
superpower with hegemony, the US has been involved with various actions
around issues of economic gains, human rights, and military actions. These
actions are closely linked with the world environment. In particular, the Carter
administration is a good example of human rights policy change as a response to
the world system. The time period (1977-1980) has significant meaning in terms
of the world environment, because the world environment slowly moved from
détente to a new tensional system (new cold war). With this environmental
change, Carter’s human rights policy became much closer to the nationalist
(realist) position. Various documents prove that US foreign policy, which started
with an emphasis on human rights and compliance with the UN (the first two
years of the Carter administration), moved to more emphasis on conflict and
military actions (during the last two years of the Carter administration).
Human rights in American foreign policy are largely associated with the
Carter administration. Some have argued that Carter tried to launch a human
rights crusade in the radical tradition of Woodrow Wilson. A review of the Carter
years shows this interpretation to be erroneous. The Carter period is one of
reform. According to Forsythe, this is not to suggest that American policy toward
5

human rights abroad (1977-1980) was well considered (Forsythe, 1984: 275).
Because of inconsistency and discontinuity of Carter’s human rights policy, there
have been many different evaluations of the Carter administration during that
time.
Several important changes in the world system occurred during this
period. In this study, the relationship between the world system and the decisionmaker’s foreign policy outputs will be examined to explain the inconsistency of
the Carter administration. In this study, this explanation will be examined from
both the realist and neoliberal perspectives in terms of Carter’s gains pursuit.
This empirical research suggests two important interpretations of the
Carter administration: 1) Carter’s foreign policy cannot be interpreted only by his
personality and value system about human rights. His changed policy also
reflected the changed world environment. 2) Therefore, there is no sharp
distinction between the last two years of Carter’s policy and the entire period of
Reagan’s foreign policy.
From this view, the fixed and dichotomized past analysis of Carter and
Reagan’s foreign policy based on personality loses its explanatory power. An
approach based on personality does not allow a plausible explanation of policy
change within the same decision-maker. The last two years of the Carter
administration clearly show a transition of US foreign policy according to the
change of the world system and require a more synthetic approach to gains
pursuit with regard to world dynamics.

6

In chapter 5, a case study of China (1971-1983) provides an
understanding of the relationship between the world system and decision-making
processes in another context (longer time period and two decision-makers). For
this chapter, I will compare Mao Tse-Tung’s decision-making outputs to Deng
Xiao-Ping’s. The case of China (1971-1983) is very useful for understanding the
interaction between the world system and the individual decision-maker. During
Mao’s era, the world system was unbalanced. That situation led Mao to seek
relative gains with the goal of keeping security. Balance of power had important
meanings at that point. On the other hand, economic development and absolute
gains were more important during Deng’s era. At this time, the world system was
much more settled than it was in Mao’s era, and the decision-maker’s sense of
threat was not significant. With close examination of China case, I will suggest
several possible answers that can explain the relationship between the world
system and gains pursuits.

Chapter 6 will provide an analysis on the world system under moderate
sense of threat with the case of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR)
agreement and the Missile Defense (MD) plan. The PNTR agreement and the
MD plan show how relative and absolute gains, security and economy matters,
and short-term and long-term gains pursuit collide with each other. The primary
mission of the MD system is defense of the US against the threat of a limited
strategic ballistic missile attack from a rogue nation. China has objected to the
MD plan and issued a warning that US plans for a national defense system, even
7

if intended to stop attacks from countries like North Korea and Iraq, would set off
a global arms race and cause more countries to develop nuclear weapons. The
case of the MD system plan clearly reflects the security dilemma and long-term
relative gains issues around the US and China. On the other hand, the case of
the PNTR agreement shows relatively short-term economic gains pursuit of both
countries under the moderate sense of threat from the world system. To China,
entering into the PNTR agreements was important as a prior step before being a
member of the WTO, an international regime. With the PNTR agreement, the US
would decrease the risk of unpredictability in its trade relationship with China.

Chapter 7 will conclude this dissertation. A summarized version of all
that has been found in support of my theory will be provided, and theoretical
implications of the findings will be discussed.
This research examines the evolution of foreign policy over time. In other
words, this research will be based on event and policy position analysis to
examine the relationship between the decision-maker's perception of the external
environment and foreign policy around issues of human rights and security
actions. For this purpose, various government statements and documents will be
analyzed.

In the next chapter, the literature review offers an examination of past
theoretical discourse in the field of international relations and a critique of 1) the

8

current theoretical bifurcation of the gains debate as well as 2) a fixed policy
analysis based on the decision-makers’ personalities.

9

Chapter II
Literature Review

1. Neorealism (Structural Realism) and Neoliberalism

The study of international relations as a subfield of political science has
been dominated by three main theoretical frameworks: classical realism, modern
realism (neorealism) and neoliberalism. (1) Classical realism holds that human
nature is a crucial determinant of the national interest, because it implies state
interest are not constructed by the international system.3

Many realists who

focus on human nature and military capabilities are placed in this category. This
realist paradigm gave us a useful framework for understanding World War II and
the Cold War. (2) Neorealism attaches more explanatory weight to the structure
of the international system, and relies on micro-economic analogies, assuming
this structure regulates state behaviors. (3) Neoliberalism shares with neorealism
an individualist approach to structure, and most neoliberals have not challenged
Kenneth Waltz’s view that power and interest are the keys to the system.
However, unlike neorealists, they see a relatively autonomous role for
institutional superstructure.
3

See Morgenthau (1948)
10

Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism provides a systemic theoretical basis for
neorealism and has elevated various reactions from scholars in the field of
international relations. Therefore, examining the basic assumptions and elements
of structural realism is very important.
Waltz has suggested the notions of structure and system as major
theoretical components. His positions on both structure and system are
discussed in his book Theory of International Politics (1979). He also suggests
his notion of level of analysis in Man, the State and War (1959). Barry Buzan,
Charles Jones, and Richard Little note that one of his major contributions to
realism is to define system structure in a way that allows it to explain some of the
behavior of units in the international system and therefore creates a firm
structural basis for the logic of power politics (Buzan 1993, 23).
Waltz’s basic arguments are developed from two questions: Why are not
actors’ intentions always in accord with outcomes in international situations? And
why does similarity of outcomes exist despite the change of actors in
international situations? To answer those questions, he argues that the level of
analysis must not be focused on the level of units, but that of system (Waltz
1979).
He criticizes past system theories that focused on the level of units
(state or substate) as reductionism. According to Waltz, past system theories do
not have a clear concept of system. In past research, the concept of the world
system is understood as the characteristics or interactions of the units. Waltz
argues that this approach provides an ‘inside out’ explanation and fails to explain
11

the similarity of outcomes in the world system. In Waltz’s view, the notion of
structure provides obvious causes that determine outcomes in international
relations.
According to Buzan, the major elements of realism as a structural
theory of international relations are “rooted in the basic ideas of system,
structure, and units” (Buzan 1993, 29). It attempts to advance “to the broader
idea of system that encompasses them” (Buzan 1993, 29). A system is
composed of a structure and a set of interacting units having behavioral
regularities and identity over time. Its structure defines the arrangement or the
ordering of its parts or units. Structures involve three major components and vary
along the three dimensions: their ordering principles, specification of the
functions of different parts, and the distribution of capabilities (power) of the units.
These three core propositions define the structure of the international system. In
international politics, the ordering principle is ‘anarchy’ rather than ‘hierarchy’.
Anarchy is the first element of structure in the international system and is viewed
as the central condition of international politics. Therefore, it is the structural
feature from which all other consequences derive. For this reason, the structural
feature of the international system has been given priority in explaining state
behavior. In this anarchic world, every state acts for its survival with the principle
of ‘self-help,’ and cooperation among nations can be limited by awareness of
‘relative gains.’ According to Waltz, the specification of functions does not exist in
international situations and political structure produces a similarity in process and
performance in international situations. In other words, international politics
12

consists of like units duplicating one another’s activities. Waltz says that the
structure of a system is changed according to the distribution of capabilities
across the system’s units. From this point of view, he emphasizes the number of
great powers. According to Waltz, although capabilities are attributes of units, the
distribution of capabilities across units is not a unit attribute, but rather a systemwide concept (Waltz 1979, 82-101). Thus, the last of the three attributes, the
distribution of capabilities, plays the central role in Waltz’s model (Holsti in Kegley
1995, 40). The distribution of power predicts variations in states’ balance-ofpower behavior. The key changes that we look for in international politics are
changes in the distribution of power across units.
In the chapter on anarchic orders and balances of power, Waltz says
that only balance of power theory is a distinctive political theory of international
politics. This theory has only two requirements: that the order be anarchic and
that it be populated by units wishing to survive. He argues that the cause of
balance of power does not come from the intention of actors but comes from the
structure automatically. In this context, international politics is structurally similar
to a market economy.
In sum, Waltz provides a more systemic theoretical basis for realism. He
develops a structural systemic theory of international politics, which is later
termed as neorealist structuralism. Waltz attempts to use systemic theory to
explain state behavior, and abandons reliance on human nature to account for
discord and conflict in world politics by focusing on the anarchic nature of the
international system and delineating the effect of the structure of the international
13

system on state behavior. Therefore, state behavior or balance of power is
explained by and predicted from the structure of the international system in
Waltz’s model.
With its notion of structure and system, Waltz’s neorealist theory relies
on the existing state-centric approach. Moreover, he argues that the essence of
international politics is based on security matters rather than power struggle. He
also emphasizes a more rigorous scientific method. These characteristics are
major differences compared to traditional realism.
As a systemized view on world politics, Waltz’s system theory describes
the general setting which states belong to. Therefore, the theory of structure
establishes categories of outcomes and shows general tendencies. Moreover,
Waltz suggests a systemized theory building with rigorous scientific methods. It is
achieved through four ways of simplification to gain parsimony: isolation,
abstraction, aggregation and idealization.
In reaction to Waltz’s structural realism, various neoliberal arguments
arose as challenges. Robert Keohane’s neoliberal approach suggests an
optimistic view of international cooperation through the idea of institutionalized
regimes, although it still accepts anarchy as the major theoretical assumption.
Keohane admits the importance of systemic theory emphasized by Waltz.
However, he points out the inconsistency between Waltz’s balance of power
theory and Waltz’s assumption that the state tries to gain maximized power. The
lack of explanation of system changes, the ambiguity of the notion of power in
Waltz’s theory, and the need for connections between internal attributes of states
14

and the international system are also discussed by Keohane. Keohane also
argues that structural realism provides an insufficient basis for the explanation of
national interests and behaviors. To revise Waltz’s limited notion of structure,
Keohane emphasizes the relations of economic interaction in international
relations. According to him, some structural realists, like Krasner, approach the
origins and maintenance of international economic regimes. However, Keohane
points out that they ignore cognitive issues, questions of information and
peaceful change of the system.
These neoliberal arguments were considered as fundamental
theoretical challenges to existing realist positions. Therefore, Stephen Krasner,
Robert Gilpin, and Kenneth Waltz suggest various rebuttals dealing with
empirical cases and reconsiderations of the basic assumptions presented by
neoliberalism.

2. Existing Bifurcation of Gains Debate

The debate between realism and neoliberalism provides the basic
elements to understand international conflict and cooperation. Joseph Grieco’s
realist response to neoliberalism provides the general overview of major
positions of both realism and neoliberalism on anarchy and gains (Grieco 1983).4

4

See Grieco, J. (1990) Cooperation among Nation. Ithaca: Cornell Unviversity
Press; and Grieco, J., D. Snidal, and R. Powell (1993) The Relative-Gains
Problem for International Cooperation. American Political Science Review
87:729-42.
15

In his book, Cooperation among Nations, Grieco examines each theory
to determine which provides the stronger analytical argument regarding the
impact of anarchy on states as they evaluate opportunities to cooperate.
According to Grieco, differences in realist and neoliberal understandings of the
problem of cooperation result from a fundamental divergence in their
interpretations of the basic meaning of international anarchy.
He argues that neo-liberalism accepts some basic realist arguments in
the following: 1) states are the major actors in world affairs, 2) states are unitary
agents, and 3) states are rational agents. Moreover, it also claims to accept
realism’s emphasis on anarchy to explain the preferences and actions of states.
Robert Axelrod, for example, seeks to address this question: ‘Under what
conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority’
(Axelrod 1981)? However, Grieco argues that the notion of anarchy is differently
understood by both groups and realism has a stronger logical grasp of the
implications of anarchy for states. Neoliberals argue that anarchy means ‘a lack
of common government in world politics’ and causes states to be ‘rational
egoists’ for maximum gains. On the other hand, realists argue that states in
anarchy recognize that there is no overarching authority to prevent others from
using violence, or the threat of violence. Therefore, states must be in greater or
lesser measure what Grieco calls ‘defensive positionalists’ for their survival and
political independence. Therefore, according to Grieco, neoliberal theory does
not give evidence of an awareness of the existence or impact of dangers
attributed to anarchy.
16

Grieco’s writing also provides the overview of major positions of both
realists and neoliberals on absolute and relative gains. To the neoliberal, the
fundamental goal of states is to attain the highest possible gain or payoff. In other
words, neoliberalism assumes that states focus on their individual absolute gains
and are indifferent to the gains of others. Neoliberalism also suggests an
optimistic view about international cooperation. Grieco refers to the scholars who
belong to this group: Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod, Arther Stein, and Charles
Lipson. On the other hand, realists argue that the core interests of states are
survival and independence. From this point of view, states are acutely sensitive
to any erosion of their relative capability and become defensive positionalists for
their relative gains. The more states care about the prospects for relative gains,
the more a gain for one state will tend to be seen as a loss by another and the
more difficult, it seems, cooperation will be. According to Grieco, realism finds
that there are at least two major barriers to international cooperation: state
concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievement of gains.
Neoliberalism pays attention exclusively to the former and is unable to identify
and analyze the latter. Therefore, realism offers a more complete understanding
than neoliberalism of the effects of anarchy on state and, by consequence, the
problem of international cooperation.

17

Grieco’s argument about the difference of major positions between
realism and neoliberalism can be described in the following TABLE 2-1.*

After Grieco suggested this critical response to neoliberalism, several
realist arguments followed with similar positions about relative gains. Stephen
Krasner also examines the various regimes in the field of global communications
and argues that the fundamental point in this field is not the choice of ‘paretooptimal frontiers’ but the matter of relative benefit distribution (Krasner, 1991).
The debate about gains pursuit is continued by Micheal Mastanduno (1991),
Robert Powell (1991, 1993), Duncan Snidal (1991, 1993), Joseph Grieco (1993),
David Baldwin (1993), and recently, Jeffrey Berejikian (1997).
While Grieco’s writing provides the classic overview of major positions of
both realists and neoliberals on the absolute and relative gains, Snidal (1993)
and Powell (1993) show the modified or reformulated (in Powell’s term)
perspectives on absolute and relative gains against the existing explanations on
those matters. With the notion of polarity or number of states, Snidal challenges
the existing realist view on relative gains. According to him, relative gains have
their greatest impact when the number of states is small or there are
asymmetries among them. According to Snidal, the realist argument that seeking
relative gains greatly diminishes possibilities for international cooperation can be
applied in the special case of tight bipolarity between states that care only about
relative gains.
*

All tables and figures can be found in the Appendix.
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Powell’s article also suggests a reformulation of the existing standard
perspective on relative and absolute gains. His major argument is very simple:
When the cost of using force is sufficiently low that the use of force actually is an
issue, cooperative outcomes that offer unequal absolute gains cannot be
supported as part of an equilibrium even though the states’ preferences are
defined only over their absolute level of economic welfare. This inability to
cooperate is in accord with the expectations of structural realism. If the use of
force is not at issue because fighting is too costly, then the results are more in
accord with neoliberalism. His new model also addresses two other issues: the
structure of the international system remains constant, but the feasibility of
cooperation varies.
Several points must be discussed for further research on absolute and
relative gains. As mentioned above, the major positions and assumptions of both
relative gains and absolute gains in the standard debate between realist and
neoliberals have produced a dichotomy of approaches to the study of
international relations. However, this abstract and theoretical dichotomy cannot
explain actual political situations because it is far from the complexity of
international relations. According to Powell, the “question of whether states
maximize absolute gains or are concerned about relative gains is empirically
meaningless” (Powell 1991, 1316). Therefore, past research based on the
dichotomy has not provided productive explanation for prediction of state
behaviors.
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Moreover, Powell’s synthetic approach is limited in its explanatory power,
since his new model is focused only on security and military matters based on
the cost of using force. For this reason, his model does not suggest a broad
synthesis which explains various contexts with flexible application of structural
realism and neoliberalism. As another weak point of Powell’s model, it must be
pointed out that his model does not provide any powerful explanations of
systemic change of world environment and state choices.
Snidal’s argument that relative gains do not limit international cooperation
has very persuasive explanatory power in the study of international relations
(Snidal, 1991, 1993). However, he does not suggest a counterexample or a case
study that supports his idea. Therefore, his arguments are based on theoretical
and abstract assumptions. Although his argument suggests the notion of polarity
and some systemic explanations of the world system dynamics, his argument
does not fully explain environmental changes in the world system. As a result, his
argument cannot explain the change of foreign policy and gains pursuit in terms
of environmental change (tension-détente movement) under a certain polarity.
As Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook (1994) point out, these debates
remain unresolved. Therefore, case studies as counterexamples that can provide
an answer with general synthetic approaches is needed to develop the former
debates on absolute and relative gains.
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3. Foreign Policy Typology based on the Decision-maker’s
Personality

In this section, research based on the decision-maker’s personality will
be discussed. David Cingranelli (1992) suggests a comprehensive typology
based on the decision maker’s personality and choice. The point of departure in
Cingranelli’s argument is the question: Should US foreign policy toward the third
world be guided by moral principles or by expediency and national interests
(Cingranelli 1992, 3)? According to Cingranelli, the decision-maker’s personality,
norms, ideology and value system are the key factors to answering this question.
Cingranelli argues that the policy maker’s moral dilemmas depend on individuals’
views that are related to Alexander George’s ‘operational code’ (Cingranelli 1992,
5-11).5 This remark also reveals that he ignores the fact that most resolutions of
foreign policy dilemmas are not only from an individual’s perspective of moral
principles, but from the balance and reconciliation of three major dimensions
which constitute the context of international relations: international environment,
national interest, and moral considerations based on gains pursuit.
Foreign policy must be explained by considering this combination, and
reconciliation where the policy makers’ dilemmas are resolved. To understand

An ‘operational code’ is a set of assumptions and a political philosophy about
the world that tend to govern when the leader responds to action-forcing events
afterward. See George, A. L.(1969) The Operational Code: A Neglected
Approach to the Study of Political Decision-Making. International Study Quarterly
12:190-222.
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this reconciliation, we need to reconsider Cingranelli’s typology which is only
based on policy-makers’ mind set.
Cingranelli argues that

“in the US, the political culture provides an

important source of values that may guide foreign policy; these values include
individualism, democracy, political equality, republicanism, capitalism, the rule of
law, and the civilian control of government... Many US Presidents have seized on
some of those virtues as ‘goods’ to be maximized in other nations through US
foreign policy. Such leaders would be characterized as either Nationalist or
Exceptionalist”(Cingranelli 1992, 7). On the other hand, there are important
universal values that have application to US foreign policy. Cingranelli suggests
that these are self-determination or autonomy, nonintervention into the affairs of
other states except under extraordinary situations, social, political, and economic
justice, and the existence of human rights. Rulers who emphasize these values
would be categorized as either progressive or radical progressive (Cingranelli
1992, 8). Neither nationalists nor progressives accept the notion of moral duties
beyond national borders, while both exceptionalists and radical progressives do.
Cingranelli’s evaluations concerning the moral positions of the full set of
US presidents in the twentieth century are in the following FIGURE 2-1 and
FIGURE 2-2.

The several interesting points could be found from the above evaluations.
First, when three Presidents (McKinley, T. Roosevelt, and Wilson) pursued
exceptionalist options, there were no powerful international institutions. Unlike the
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progressives, their human rights policy could not support the UN framework.
Therefore, it seems natural to be exceptionalist for the Presidents who were
seeking human rights policy during that period. Moreover, could we analyze
Reagan and Bush’s nationalist foreign policies without the consideration of a new
cold war? Could we consider Johnson and Nixon/Ford’s nationalist option without
the consideration of the Vietnam War? From 1944 to 1964, Truman, Eisenhower
and Kennedy provided most of the political energy and financial lubrication that
kept the UN growing. Beginning in 1964, however, the US relapsed into power
politics and large-scale military action outside the framework of the UN (Yost
1972, 183-4). To explain this event, we cannot ignore the Vietnam War and US
security interests in 1964.
As shown above, in reality, there is no one who fits the radical
progressive category. This implies that the decision-maker cannot be free from
national interest concerns in the foreign policy decision-making process.
Therefore, the policy maker may have two options: pursuing goals of foreign
policy without involvement of norms, values and morality (nationalist) or pursuing
goals of foreign policy with involvement of norms, values and moral concerns.
(exceptionalist and progressive).
The important factors for making decisions with these two options are not
only the decision-maker’s personality or value system. Two other aspects, the
world environment and the hierarchy (or priority) within national interests could
be significant factors in explaining taking options. For example, when the world
system is highly unstable and the decision-maker’s sense of threat is quite high,
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the security concern could be more important than propagation of influence or
value within national interest. Therefore, there is a better possibility that policy
makers might take the nationalist option. In the case of this new hypothesis, all
three dimensions, the world system, national interests, and moral consideration,
could be significant factors for explanations.
According to a broad notion of national interests, promoting US national
ideals such as individualism, democracy, rule of law, and civilian control of
government, is among the major national interests in foreign policy (Nuechterlein
1985, 6-30). This point of view constructs the major position of the exceptionalist
in terms of national interests. Therefore, not only nationalists, but also all three
positions except radical progressive are pursuing national interests with a
broader concept of national interests such as expansion of US influence.
Gains pursuit based on the hierarchy of national interests can be seriously
affected by the external environment. The changed priority of national interests
also decides the size of the overlapping area among security gains, values,
norms and the range of the concept of national interests. When the world
environment is highly unstable and the decision-maker’s sense of threat is quite
high, the security concern could be prior to propagation of influence or value
within national interest. Therefore, there is a better possibility that the policy
maker might take the nationalist option. With changed priorities from influence to
security, most of foreign policy decision-making would focus on security matter,
and require foreign compliance with moral values only when fundamental security
matters are threatened. The concept of national interest and size of overlapping
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area between interest and moral values would become more narrow than before.
In the case of this new hypothesis, all three dimensions, world environment,
national interests, and moral consideration could play important roles as the
significant factors for explanations.
From this perspective, we are able to assume two important interpretations
of the Carter administration: 1) Carter’s foreign policy cannot be interpreted only
by his personality and value system about human rights. His changed policy also
reflected the changed world environment. 2) Therefore, there is no sharp
distinction between the last two years of Carter’s policy and the entire period of
Reagan’s foreign policy.
In the next chatpter, the above hypotheses and interpretation of the
relationship between the world environment and foreign policy decision-making
influenced by changed priority of national interests and the decision-maker’s
sense of threat will be discussed.
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Chapter III
Hypotheses, Variables, Definitions, Data, and Cases

In this study, the world environment and the decision-maker’s sense of
threat are two major independent variables to explain the decision-maker’s
choices. First, the world environment, which varies between tension and detente
or balance and unbalance, can be illustrated in the following TABLE 3-1 and
FIGURE 3-1.
For the levels of sense of threat, ‘uncertainty’ and a ‘sense of urgency’
from the external world play very important roles.

• Higher level of threat: According to Graham Allison (1971), each state’s
best choice depends on what it expects from the external environment.

6

When

there is an unexpected and unfavorable change of a balance of power, lack of
information about military capacity, goals and intentions of other nations makes it
difficult for decision-makers to interpret a changed situation. Decision-makers
also have difficulty assessing the expected utility of alternative sets of
consequences that might result from a particular action. Moreover, decision-
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makers are not able to rank in order of preference each possible set of
consequences. This situation causes lack of flexibility and stability in the
decision-making process.
The decision-making process also lacks ‘consistency’: consistency
among goals and objectives relative to a particular action; consistency in the
application of principles in order to select the optimal alternative.

Due to

cognitive dissonance in decision-makers’ minds, they do not have confidence
about the choices they make.
Uncertainty caused from a changed environment might cause a sense of urgency
for decision-makers.
Decision-makers might try to regain a balance of power or change an
unfavorable status quo via military actions or economic sanctions. Keeping
sovereignty and maintaining national security for survival are vital goals of
decision-making. In this situation, decision-making depends more on the problem
solving process than on blueprints. Decision-makers do not have enough time to
review, integrate or harmonize various opinions.

• Medium level of threat: There is no immediate change of balance of
power.

However, a latent threat can be detected and evaluated through

information about the military capacity of rival states. In this situation, decision-

6

Allison, Graham. 1971, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis, Harper Collins Publishers
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makers have confidence in their security but need to make a conscious effort to
make long-term security plans.
Decision-makers have enough time and opportunities to prepare for a
possible change of balance of power on the long-term basis. They might be
assisted by an epistemic community, ‘a network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain or issue-areas’ (Haas 1992, 3),
to collect information about the rival country’s capability and to set up blueprints
for future foreign policy decision-making.
Decision-makers focus on not only national security but also various
national interests including economic benefit and expansion of national influence
to the world. Various trade, ideology, and human rights issues might collide with
each other. These issues are not easily harmonized due to different assessments
of gains among decision-makers. Moreover, the interpretation of treaties or the
rule of international regimes might cause possible disputes among states.
Therefore, reconciling each different interest is very important for policy
coordination.

• Lower level of threat: When there is a favorable status quo of the
world system and the relationship with other states is predictable, uncertainty and
a sense of urgency in the decision-making process are minimal. In this case, the
decision-making process becomes stable and flexible, because decision-makers
have enough information and opportunities to review all possible options.
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In this situation, decision-makers are able to harmonize various inner
opinions and to adjust their long-term goals and policies. They also have clear
visions and blueprints in their decision-making process.
Decision-makers have enough capacity and time to implement a longterm program for economic development via creating or strengthening
international regimes and treaties. An internally consistent belief system
encourages decision-makers to construct a view of a stable, regularized, and
orderly environment in their minds.

7

According to Yaacov Vertzberger (1990),

this consistency gives decision-makers a sense of confidence in their
understanding of the environment and of unjustified assurance that their policies
are likely to achieve their ends, leaving a much smaller margin for error and
surprise than reality demands.

Three main sets of hypotheses will be examined to explain the relationship
between the sense of threat in the decision-maker’s mind-set and gains pursuits.

I. When the sense of threat from world environment is high, the decision-maker
tries to take realist options (based on perspective of realism). In this case, most
foreign policy decision-making focuses on security matters, pursuing relative
gains. To gain equilibrium in power in the world system and to escape from an
existing unfavorable environment, the decision-maker tries to change the status
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quo through relative gains concerns. Foreign compliance to rules, institutions,
and moral values is required only when fundamental security matters are
threatened. Various issues in international relations conglomerate around
security matters (high politics). The case of the last two years of Carter
administration (Chapter 4) and the case of Mao (Chapter 5) will be examined to
explain the relationship between the decision-maker’s higher sense of threat and
relative gains pursuit.

II. When the sense of threat from the world system is moderate, the tendency to
conglomerate issues in international relations becomes lower. Although the
decision-maker’s gain calculations are still based on relative gains, various
opinions about 1) long- term or short-term gains or 2) the range of the concept of
national interest (broad or narrow) in both security areas and economy areas can
be suggested in the decision-making process with diffused issues. Emphasizing
short-term gains leads the decision-makers to absolute economic gains
concerns. Focusing on long-term gains eventually leads decision-makers to
relative security gains concerns. Decision-makers do not make a special effort to
change the status quo. In chapter 6, the case of the PNTR agreement (shortterm absolute gains pursuit around economic issues) and the case of the NMD
plan (long-term relative gains around security issues) will be examined to explain

7

Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I.1990. The World in Their Minds : Information
Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
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the decision-maker’s choices with moderate sense of threat from the world
system.

III. When the sense of threat from the world system is low, the decision-maker
tries to keep this favorable status quo and becomes more sensitive to economic
gains, cooperation, and compliance to rule and value through international
regimes and absolute gains pursuit. Therefore, the decision-maker would take
the exceptionalist or progressive options advocating international activism and
interventionism in a much wider variety of situations. Therefore, a stable world
environment leads the decision-maker to compliance with rules and regulations
of international organizations and international law to maintain the existing
international regime (based on perspective of neoliberalism). Various issues in
international relations conglomerate around economic gains. Therefore, the level
of issue conglomeration again becomes higher. The case of the first two years of
the Carter administration (chapter 4) and the case of Deng (chapter 5) will be
examined to explain the relationship between low sense of threat and absolute
gains pursuit.
In sum, when the sense of threat is either high or low, decisionmakers try to change the status quo with a high level of issue conglomeration
(around security matters or economic gains). When sense of threat is moderate,
decision-makers do not exert special effort to change the status quo. Although
relative gains are still basic concerns in the decision-making process, various
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dissenting opinions are suggested in terms of a range of concepts of national
interest and long-term or short-term period gains.
The relationship between the level of issue conglomeration and the sense
of threat can be illustrated in the following FIGURE 3-2.

Both (neo)realism and neoliberalism implicitly use a rational actor
approach for foreign policy analysis. This traditional approach reveals the basic
logic of the behavior of state and decision-maker’s activity. Moreover, this model
explains complicated international situations and decision-makers’ behavior by a
few simple assumptions.8
This rationality comes from the ability to find the best or the most
efficient means under a given set of circumstances to accomplish a specified set
of objectives. Therefore, ‘rational behavior’ is motivated by a conscious
calculation of advantages, and this calculation is based on an explicit and
internally consistent value system. In this approach, it is also important that each
state’s best choice depends on what it expects the other to do. Strategic behavior
influences an actor’s choice by working on his expectations of how his behavior
is related to his adversary’s. For this reason, the behavior of the other is very
important to a nation’s decision-making.

8

The basic assumptions and problems of this classical approach are well
illustrated by Graham Allison’s well-known study of Cuban missile crisis.
According to Allison, the concept of ‘rationality’ is formalized by economics,
decision-making theories, and game theories as well as the less structured
notion that underlies our everyday assumptions of human purposiveness both in
individual behavior and international foreign policy. See Allison (1969).
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Allison argues that this approach is the most frequently used model for
the analysis of foreign policy decision-making. Although there is certain kind of
simplicity in this approach, this model reveals the basic logic of decision-making.
However, this approach has been criticized due to its simplicity. Lacking an
objective and independent means of establishing utility values, the rational actor
model also leaves to the discretion of the decision-maker the matter of
determining relative value. Another limitation of this model comes from its
ignorance of personality and perception in the decision-making process.
To overcome these weaknesses of rational actor approach, this study
focuses on the matter of identity, perception, and relationships among states
(which can be described as enemies, rivals or partners) in the decision-making
process as well as an analysis of military capacity/economic utility. Using a
qualitative method based on the analysis of decision-makers’ speeches and
documents is another way to bring a richer background for deeper analysis which
compensates the simplicity of rational actor models.

Several cases will be examined to understand the relationship between
the dynamics of the world system and the decision-maker’s mind-set. The case
of the US is very useful for this purpose. As a superpower with hegemony, the
US has been involved in various actions around issues of economic gains,
human rights, and military actions, and these actions are closely linked with the
world environment. In particular, the Carter administration stands as a good
example of human rights policy change as a response to the world system. The
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time period (1977-1980) has significant meaning in terms of the world
environment, because the world environment slowly moved from détente to a
new tensional system (new cold war).
With this environmental change, Carter’s human rights policy became
much closer to the nationalist (realist) position. Various documents prove that the
US foreign policy, which started with an emphasis on human rights and
compliance with the UN (the first two years of the Carter administration), moved
to emphasis for conflict and military action (during the last two years of the Carter
administration).
In his early years, Carter emphasized the role of international
organizations and multilateral diplomacy more than his immediate predecessors
had. He announced his firm support for and commitment to the United Nations.
Carter’s hopes for the expansion of human rights, for world peace, and
for an end to cold war confrontations faded away in his last two years of office as
revolutionary Iran besieged the US embassy in Teheran and took American
hostages, and as the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. By the end of Carter’s
term, confrontation, not cooperation, seemed the hallmark of international affairs.
In this study, the relationship between the world system around the US
and the decision-maker’s foreign policy outputs will be examined to explain this
inconsistency of the Carter administration. This empirical research suggests two
important interpretations of the Carter administration: 1) Carter’s foreign policy
cannot be interpreted only by his personality and value system about human
rights. His changed policy also reflected the changed world environment. 2)
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Therefore, there is no sharp distinction between the last two years of Carter’s
policy and the entire period of Reagan’s foreign policy. Because of the
inconsistency and discontinuity of Carter’s human rights policy, there have been
many different evaluations of the Carter administration during that time.
From this view, the fixed and dichotomized past analysis of Carter and
Reagan’s foreign policy based on personality loses its explanatory power. An
approach based on personality does not allow a plausible explanation of policy
change within the same decision-maker. The last two years of the Carter
administration clearly show a transition of US foreign policy according to the
change of the world system and require a more synthetic approach to gain
pursuit with regard to world dynamics. In this study, the case of the Carter
administration will be examined from both realist and neoliberal perspectives in
terms of Carter’s gains pursuit.
The FIGURE 3-3 illustrated the relationship between the world system
and gains pursuit in the case of the Carter administration.
As another case for my dissertation, I will compare Mao Tse-Tung’s
decision-making outputs to Deng Xiao-Ping’s. The case of China (1971-1983) is
very useful for the understanding of the interaction between the world system
and the individual decision-maker. During Mao’s era, the world system was
unbalanced. That situation led Mao to relative gains with the goal of keeping
security. Balance of power had important meanings at that point. On the other
hand, economic development and absolute gains were more important during
Deng’s era. At that time, the world system was much more settled than during
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Mao’s era, and the decision-maker’s sense of threat was not significant. With
close examination of the case of China, this research will suggest several
possible answers that can fully explain the relationship between the world system
and gains pursuits.
To understand state choice under moderate sense of threat, I will
examine the current Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) agreement and
the Missile Defense (MD) plan, which show how relative and absolute gains,
security and economy matters, short-term and long-term gains pursuit collide
with each other. The primary mission of the MD system is defense of the US
against the threat of a limited strategic ballistic missile attack from a rogue nation.
China has objected to the MD plan and issued a warning that US plans for a
national defense system, even if intended to stop attacks from countries like
North Korea and Iraq, would set off a global arms race and cause more countries
to develop nuclear weapons. The case of the MD system plan clearly reflects the
security dilemma and long-term relative gains issues around the US and China.
On the other hand, the case of the PNTR agreement shows relatively short-term
economic gains pursuit by both countries under moderate sense of threat from
the world system. To China, entering into the PNTR agreements was important
as a prior step before being a member of the WTO, an international regime. With
the PNTR agreement, the US would decrease the risk of unpredictability in its
trade relationship with China.
This study examines the evolution of foreign policy over time using the
qualitative case study method. In other words, this research will be based on
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event and policy position analysis to examine the relationship between the
decision-maker's perception of the external environment and foreign policy
around issues of human rights and security actions. Various government
statements and documents are analyzed for this purpose.
The qualitative method refers to forms of data collection and analysis
which rely on understanding ‘meanings.’ This type of analysis is based on
detailed descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions, observed
behaviors, direct quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes,
beliefs, and thoughts, and excerpts or entire passages from documents,
correspondence, records, and case histories. Through this approach, the
qualitative method produces ‘rich’ and ‘deep’ data. Virtually all qualitative
researches, regardless of their theoretical differences, reflect some sort of
individual phenomenological perspectives. According to Patton (1990), the
cardinal principle of qualitative analysis is that causal relationships and
theoretical statements be clearly emergent from and grounded in the phenomena
studies.
This qualitative method also has its own inherited weakness; research
based on a small number of cases is easily biased. Generalization is hard to
achieve due to lack of external validity in small-N case studies. The strength of
this type of research, however, is that the data for qualitative analysis help us to
identify and address internal validity problems of quantitative data. This type of
analysis provides theoretical richness and depth which might strengthen our
logical inference.
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Warwick and Lininger (1975) suggest that the following circumstances
are good for qualitative analysis: 1) when the research requires an examination
of complex social relationships or intricate patterns of interaction; 2) when the
investigator desires first-hand behavioral information on certain social processes,
such as leadership and influence in a group; 3) when a major goal of the study is
to construct a qualitative contextual picture of a certain situation or flow of events;
and 4) when it is necessary to infer latent value patterns or belief systems from
such behaviors as ceremonial addresses, statements and gestures.
On the other hand, this research also uses case study methods. I will
discuss how qualitative case study is distinguished from other types of qualitative
research and statistical survey research. According to Robert K. Yin (1994), “the
case study has long been stereotyped as a weak sibling among social science
methods,” being seen as providing a poor basis for scientific generalization (or as
having poor external validity).

9

This traditional prejudice against the case study

confuses case studies with survey research in which a sample is used to
generalize to a larger population and which is based on statistical generalization.
However, case studies attempt to generalize a particular set of observed results
to some broader theory rather than to some population as in survey research.
Yin (1994) contends that case studies, like scientific experiments, are
generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations like survey
research. Like the experiment, the case study does not represent a ‘sample;’ the

9

Yin, Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed.,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, P. xiii.
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goal is to expand and generalize theories (‘analytic generalization’) and not to
enumerate sample frequencies (‘statistical generalization’). As three notable
social scientists, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman describe in their single case study,
the goal is to do a ‘generalizing’ rather than a ‘particularizing’ analysis.

10

In

statistical generalization, an inference is made about a population on the basis of
empirical data collected about the sample. In analytic generalization, a previously
developed theory is used as a template with which to analyze and compare the
empirical results of case studies, analogous to the way a scientist generalizes
from experimental results to theory. If two or more cases are shown to support
the same theory, replication will be claimed. Analytic generalization can be
produced whether the case study involves a single case or multiple cases. 11
Another common misunderstanding is to confuse case studies with
some types of qualitative research, such as ethnographies, participantsobservations, or any type of fieldwork, which are considered either as data
collection techniques or as the initial stage of observations that generate
hypotheses. However, case studies are a form of empirical inquiry that does not
depend solely on ethnographic or participant-observer data. One could even do a
valid and high-quality case study without leaving the library, depending upon the
topic being studied. For case studies, theory development as part of the design
phase is an essential step, whether the ensuing case study’s purpose is to
develop or to test a theory. Theory development not only provides guidance for

10
11

Ibid., p. 10
Ibid., p. 30-1.
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what data to collect, but also is the level at which the generalization of the case
study results occurs. Most importantly, a crucial property shared by the various
types of qualitative research is that the analysis is inductive and it attempts to
avoid prior commitment to any theoretical model. In contrast, a qualitative case
study is a type of empirical inquiry in which the analysis is deductive and starts
with constructing a preliminary theory related to the topic of study.
According to Coppedge (1999), small-N case studies tend to be more
faithful to the rich concepts that inspire our theories and tend to be more
sensitive to the complex and conditional causal relationships and intertwined
levels of analysis that most closely approximate our intuitive understanding of
how the political world really works.
Because this qualitative case study method provides rich contextual
pictures, such as background of policymaking, decision-makers’ mind-set, and
some other socio-economic factors, this dissertation relies on the qualitative case
study method to explain the complex phenomena around foreign policy decisionmaking.
Given the nature of the qualitative research, this dissertation relies mainly
upon textual analysis, and focuses on two types of texts: one includes official
documents, governmental resolutions, policy statements, leaders’ speeches,
official party magazines, and newspapers; the other involves academic
publications. What needs to be stressed here is that the official documents and
the official press should be considered as very important part of primary data for
this study, since the purpose of this study is to interpret and evaluate decision40

makers’ gains pursuit and their policy outputs. The official documents, including
work reports or political addresses, resolutions, decisions and speeches of top
leaders from the party congresses and plenary sessions, are the key indicators to
understand decision-makers’ gains pursuit and justification of their policies or
positions in decision-making process. Those documents reflect the background
of political agendas and play critical roles in establishing the legitimacy of
policies. The official press propagates the administration’s official positions,
serves as an important vehicle for the leaders to communicate their policy
orientation and gains pursuit to other decision-makers and to the whole
population, reflects the conflict between competing perspectives within the same
policy output, and educates the public on the current political line.
Major documents that will be examined for the case of the Carter
administration include reports from the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus
in 1989, a prepared statement submitted for the record of the hearings on
‘Reconciling Human Rights and Security Interests in Asia,’ in 1982, and
addresses by Carter and by Vance in 1977.
China has issued many official statements which express their diplomatic
actions to the external world. According to Barnett (1985, 111-9), official
statements and publications from influential Chinese presses, such as the
People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), play important roles in China’s foreign policy.
Moreover, the People’s Daily takes a role of a special agency which represents
China’s positions to the external world. Therefore, the data for the cases of China
are based on official statements, the constitutions, government publications, Mao
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and Deng’s addresses, major articles of the organ paper of the communist party,
and the Beijing Review which provides an English translation of the People’s
Daily.
For the PNTR agreement and the MD cases, all written official
documents such as fact sheets, booklets, web texts about the MD and the PNTR
released from the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of
State, and the Department of Commerce during 1999-2001 are reviewed.
Moreover, numerous related speeches and testimonies about these issues on
the websites of the Department of State are also thoroughly examined. Major
articles about the MD and the PNTR from the New York Times and the
Washington Post are used as secondary sources for this research.
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Chapter IV
The Case of the Carter Administration (1977-1980)

In this chapter, the hypotheses discussed in the second chapter and
interpretations of the relationship between the world environment and the Carter
administration’s foreign policy decision-making influenced by changed priority of
national interests and the sense of threat will be examined.
The world environment is an independent variable (X) which varies
between tension and détente or balance and unbalance. Foreign policy actions
or decisions around human rights issues are the dependent variable (Y). Two
main groups of hypotheses will be examined to explain the relationship between
the sense of threat in the decision-maker’s mind-set and gains pursuits.

I. When the sense of threat from world environment is high, the decision-maker
tries to take realist/nationalist options (based on perspective of realism). In this
case, most foreign policy decision-making would focus on security matters,
pursuing relative gains. To gain equilibrium in power in the world system and to
escape from an existing unfavorable environment, the decision-maker tries to
change the status quo through relative gains concerns. Foreign compliance to
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rules, institutions, and moral values is required only when fundamental security
matters are threatened. Various issues in international relations conglomerate
around security matters (high politics). The case of the last two years of the
Carter administration will be examined to explain the relationship between the
decision-maker’s higher sense of threat and relative gains pursuit.

II. When the sense of threat from the world system is low, the decision-maker
tries to keep this favorable status quo and becomes more sensitive to economic
gains, cooperation, and compliance to rule and value through international
regime and absolute gains pursuit. Therefore, the decision-maker would take the
exceptionalist or progressive options advocating international activism and
interventionism in a much wider variety of situations. Therefore, a stable world
environment leads the decision-maker to compliance with rules and regulations
of international organizations and international law to maintain the existing
international regime (based on perspective of neoliberalism). The case of the
first two years of the Carter administration will be examined to explain the
relationship between low sense of threat and absolute gains pursuit.

The change in the world environment as an independent variable in the
case of the Carter administration (1976-1980) can be illustrated in the Figure 4-1.
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1. World Environment I (

- 1976)

One important influence on the Carter administration’s human rights
policy during the first two years was détente. In the relationship between the US
and the USSR, the talks promoting a better relationship started in 1970. In March
1970, there was a conference between the two superpowers on the status of
Berlin. After that, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were held in Vienna
and Helsinki. There, both Superpowers approached détente. This détente was
made official by Breznev in the 24th Communist Congress in April 1971. He
emphasized the importance of the improved relationship between the US and the
USSR. Therefore, the movement between the US and the USSR gave advance
notice of their future cooperation for the balance of power in the world. From
1969 to 1976, Kissinger had tried to achieve the major goal of US foreign policy,
to contain Soviet power by co-opting the USSR into a concert of great powers.
This restyled Congress of Vienna (1815) was to bring both the Soviet Union and
China fully into the international system, and therefore give them a vested
interest in stabilizing, not overturning, that system (Forsythe 1989, 105). Détente,
or the reduction of great power tensions, was the means to this end. Increased
east-west trade and reduced inflammatory rhetoric were the parts of the new
process directed to the traditional goal of limiting Soviet (and Chinese) power.
Nixon’s China initiative and his coordinated effort to achieve détente in relations
with the Soviet Union provided a significant ground for the start of Carter’s
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human rights policy. This more stable world environment gave Carter’s
administration a chance to promote human rights and US influence rather than
the expansion of military power during the first two years. The security concerns
were less salient at that time, and Carter’s sense of threat from the external
environment was not so significant. In this context, the Carter administration
could pursue the progressive option based on reconciliation between human
rights policy and other national interests.

2. Rhetoric and Actions I (1977-1978)

The Carter administration breathed new life into human rights programs
of international organizations. This was true of the Organization of American
States, where the US had an overriding influence. Carter and his advisers
concluded that human rights were ‘the perfect unifying principle’ needed to give
US foreign policy the moral thrust that it had lacked during the Nixon-Ford Period
(Lillich and Hannum 1995, 1041). Thus, in his inaugural address, the president
singled out human rights as a key element in his proposed new foreign policy,
declaring that “our commitment to human rights must be absolute......Because we
are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere” (Lillich
and Hannum 1995, 1041). He also stated that the United states needed a foreign
policy “that is democratic, that is based on fundamental Values, and that uses
power and influence... for humane purposes” (Lillich and Hannum 1995,1047).
Carter developed this theme in his 17 March 1977 address to the United Nations.
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During the first year of his administration, President Carter signed the InterAmerican Convention on Human Rights and actively encouraged O.A.S. Member
States to ratify the convention. Results were quick in coming: the convention
went into force in July 1977 --less than two months after the president signed the
treaty. The State Department also played a preeminent role in revitalizing the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an independent expert body
largely ignored by the Organization’s Member States. The Commission had been
limited to reviewing individual complaints through correspondence. Now the
Commission would undertake visiting missions to states with human rights
problems, and US diplomacy played an active role in gaining access to these
states for the Commission.
The Carter administration also undertook a constructive role in
strengthening the UN in the human rights field. The US delegation to the
Commission on Human Rights under the Carter administration made an
important contribution in strengthening the UN’s ability to investigate gross
violations of human rights. The revised procedures for reviewing human rights
complaints converted the UN commission into a vital forum with the active
participation of nongovernmental organizations, and affected governments.12
Two related factors pervade Carter’s relationship with the UN: one was
his public commitment to human rights, the other his determination to respond
with sensitivity to the concerns of the underdeveloped world.
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The last and perhaps most significant tool for human rights diplomacy -sanctions-- took on new meaning. Under the previous two administrations,
sanctions were not used to advance human rights objectives. Under the Carter
administration, sanctions became a commonly accepted tool for promoting
human rights.
Carter also promised to restrain arms exports during his early years. In
1976, while still a candidate, Carter raised the issue of arms sales for the first
time in a presidential campaign. Arguing that “the United States cannot be both
the world’s leading champion of peace and the world’s leading supplier of the
weapons of war,” Carter promised that, if elected, he would work, “to increase the
emphasis on peace and to reduce the commerce in arms” (New York Times June
24, 1976). In 1977, Carter ordered his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, to
develop a set of recommendations for a new arms export policy. After a final
review by the National Security Council, the proposed guidelines for arms
restraint were adopted on May 13, 1977, with the signing of Presidential Directive
No. 13 (PD-13). The new policy was then made public on May 19, with the
release of a presidential statement on conventional arms transfers (Klare 1984,
42).
In sum, early actions of the Carter administration yielded impressive
results: the Panama Canal treaties, improved Third World relationships in Africa
and Latin America, Andrew Young’s leadership in the United Nations, the Camp
Andrew Jackson Young Jr., served as US ambassador to the UN from 197779. He was controversial because of his attempts to make the US more
12
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David peace accords between Israel and Egypt, and establishment of official
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Carter pursued
moral foreign policy that would harmonize American strategic objectives with
professed beliefs in justice, peace, protection of human rights, and nuclear arms
control. With his optimistic rhetoric that emphasized the ‘improved’ role that the
US could play by generously cooperating with others, Carter’s early foreign policy
can be described as 1) the assurance that America’s strength allowed it to be
generous and cooperative; and 2) the promise of an emergent world community
characterized by greater justice and peaceful change. He claimed that America’s
strength allowed it to champion human rights, practice preventive diplomacy, and
deal constructively with the opportunities by this complex interdependent world.

3. World Environment II (1979-1980)

During Carter’s last two years in office, the major problems faced by the
Carter administration changed dramatically. This change, however, was not due
to a ‘born again’ grasp of presidential leadership, but to foreign events over which
he had no control, to which he had to react rather than initiate (Windt 1987).
On November 4, 1979, Iranian students captured the American
Embassy in Teheran, taking some 60 Americans as hostage. They demanded a
return of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, for trial as a war criminal. The
responsive to moral issues in foreign policy.
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Shah had entered the US 12 days before for a cancer operation. President
Carter refused to accede to this demand, and the long occupation of the
Embassy began. This was the most dramatic event of the Carter administration.
At that time, Soviet bloc countries were advocating caution as well. East German
Leader Erich Honecker wrote to Carter in December, expressing his hope that
“all parties will exercise extreme restraints and will do nothing that might lead to
an aggravation of the situation. A peaceful resolution of conflict will be interest of
all people.”13 With regard to the rescue mission, there was a fear that the Iranians
would invite the Soviet Union into the region to help with minesweeping and that
this offer would provide the Soviet government with a political and military
opening in the region that the US wanted to prevent. Secretary of State, Cyrus
Vance, argued that there was a real chance that we would force the Iranians into
the arms of the Soviets. Then, in late December, Soviet armed forces invaded
Afghanistan to prop up a faltering pro-Soviet government. Soon, more than a
hundred thousand troops occupied much of Afghanistan. Declaring that ‘crises’
required his full attention as President, Carter suspended all planned
campaigning for renomination (including a scheduled debate among himself,
Senator Kennedy and Governor Brown in Iowa) and spoke to the public as
infrequently as possible (Windt 1987, 284). This State of the Union Address, the
so-called Carter Doctrine, in January 23, 1980 will be discussed in the next
section.

13

Letter, Honecker to Carter, 1979.
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In sum, the ‘shock’ of 1979--the fall of the shah and subsequent oil shortage,
the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba,
the seizure of American diplomats in Teheran, and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan--profoundly challenged the grand design of the Carter foreign policy.

4. Rhetoric and Actions II

During this period, the remarkable inconsistency of Carter’s human rights
policy could found in terms of the lack of implementation of his former rhetoric
about human rights. In these last two years in office, after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and seizure of the US embassy in Teheran, Carter’s foreign policy in
general tilted away from the cooperative internationalism of Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance, who resigned over the Iranian hostage raid, and toward the militant
internationalism of national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. It is clear from
Carter’s statements that he was deeply shocked and offended by the Soviet
action. Carter’s policy changed from one emphasizing patience and negotiation
to one based more on confrontation and competition.
The State of the Union address is more a State of the World address.
Carter devoted most of his time to foreign affairs.14 The most significant policy
statement regarded the Soviet Union: A warning that any attempt to gain control

Only two sentences were used to mention inflation which had grown to an
annual rate of 13.5% in 1979. See Windt (1987, 284).
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of the Persian Gulf would be repelled by the United States using “any means
necessary, including military force”(Windt 1987, 284). The unstable world
environment brought a much higher sense of threat to Carter. He said “the
implications of the soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious
threat to the peace since the Second World War......The Soviet Union must pay a
concrete price for their aggression” (Windt 1987, 286; emphasis added). This
statement became known as the Carter doctrine. The speech generally took a
hard-line on foreign policy and stood in contrast to the President’s statements
and attitudes during the first two years of his administration. This resulted in a
downgrading in emphasis on human rights, and upgrading in power competition
with the Soviet Union (Forsythe 1989, 114). In fact, the mood of the entire
country shifted, albeit incompletely, away from the Vietnam syndrome (a
reluctance to become involved in foreign armed conflict), and toward an
emphasis on more military spending, which was not totally incompatible with a
weakened Vietnam syndrome. (One can want to be better prepared, but still be
reluctant to become involved.) In broad terms, the country as a whole wanted to
focus on power, not so much on rights, and on economics, given stagflation.
Don Bonker’s remarks in the hearing on ‘Reconciling Human Rights and
US Security Interest in Asia’ illustrate well the change in position by the Carter
administration at that time.

We have in the vast geography of Asia many areas in which
human rights and our strategic interests are in conflict and need to be
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reconciled. I would like for you to offer just a summary view of at least
three specific areas where these policies or objectives might be in
conflict: First of all, in Pakistan; second, in the Philippines, and third, in
South Korea...... Six months after the Carter administration had
reduced security assistance to Pakistan for human rights reason, the
Russians invaded Afghanistan. We immediately rushed $400 million in
military assistance to Pakistan. That is a prime example of what
happens when our strategic interests may clash with our human rights
concerns-so much for human rights, it goes out the window, even in the
Carter administration. In the case of the Philippines, you have our
heavy investment in military bases to further our security interests there
versus certain human right problems.... In the case of El Salvador, you
(Patt Derian) have a President who says that we need to extend
security assistance to El Salvador to protect our interests there. At the
same time, El Salvador’s human rights record ranks among the worst in
the world (Committee on Foreign Affairs 1983, 526-8; emphasis added).

Military expenditures, which had decreased after the end of the Vietnam
War, started to increase again during the last two years of the Carter
administration (Kruzel 1988, 46). Moreover, after collapse of Iran’s Shah, arms
trades with Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were dramatically expanded from
1979 to 1980 (Klare 1984, 12). Although Carter never formally rescinded the
guidelines announced on May 19, 1977 (New Arms Restraint Policy Guidelines
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PD-13), his “arms restraint” policy was effectively abandoned in March 1980
when he barred any further reductions in sales to the nonexempt countries (Klare
1984, 46).
On January 4, 1980, Carter met with his advisers to review forty
proposed sanctions against the Soviet

Union in response to its attack on

Afghanistan. He decided to pursue multiple response including economic,
cultural, and diplomatic initiatives. Of these, Carter selected seven:
• Embargo of future grain sales;
• Cancellation of all planned state visits and meetings;
• Banishment of the Soviet fishing fleet from US territorial waters;
• Denial of international credits to the USSR;
• Restriction of high-technology transfer;
• Strengthening of ties with other countries fearful of Soviet aggression-namely
the PRC; and
• Boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow.15

See Drachman and Shank (1997). Of the seven responses he selected,
perhaps the most controversial was the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic
Games scheduled for Moscow. Forcing athletes who had trained their entire lives
for the Olympics to this level of sacrifice questioned federal power over the
citizenry.
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5. Mechanism and Relationship

During the first two years of the Carter administration, “President Carter
had never promised that human rights would supersede all other foreign policy
interests; but neither did he say that national security would supersede human
rights. Moreover, these two apparently conflicting interests can be mutually
supportive” (Newsome 1986, 63). However, the revolutionary challenges from the
third world such as Angola, Iran and Nicaragua and new tension caused by
Soviet’s Afghanistan invasion brought a higher sense of threat to the Carter
administration. This external instability made the Carter administration fail to
reconcile its security interests and human rights policy. In this context, the
concept of national interests and the overlapping areas between the goal of
human rights and other national interests became much narrower than before.
According to Newsom,

the Carter administration was seen by some as having double
standard for its human rights policy. With respect to those countries not
considered strategic to national security, the administration was willing
to use sanctions; but for those countries considered strategic to national
security, sanctions were virtually eliminated as a potential tool for
human rights diplomacy [i.e., the case of supporting military regime in
Korea in 1980]. The credibility and moral legitimacy of the policy was
impaired by this double standard. The administration lacked the vision
55

to see that over the long run human rights and national security are
inextricably linked (Newsom 1986, 64).

With the failure of reconciliation of human rights policy and national security,
the Carter administration’s foreign policy moved from the progressive position to
the nationalist position in this period. This tendency became more visible during
the last two years of the Carter administration when the world environment
turned to new tensional situations. The sense of threat is a key point to
understand this mechanism.
The FIGURE 4-2 illustrates the mechanism of gains pursuit with regard to
the world environment.

During the early years of the Carter administration, his progressive positions
can be well explained from the perspective of neoliberalism, the major
perspective of international relations. The more stable world environment around
the US led Carter to compliance with rules and regulations of international
organizations

to

maintain

the

existing

international

regime

advocating

international activism within the UN context.
The perspective of realism could gain more explanatory power to interpret
the last two years of the Carter administration in terms of security dilemma with
the higher sense of threat and changed policy actions based on realpolitik by
Carter.
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6. Conclusion

In this study, the relationship between the dynamics of the world system
and the decision-maker’s gains pursuit have been explained through the case of
the Carter administration. The conclusion of this study can be suggested in the
following:
In his early years, Carter evinced a much greater interest in
international organizations and multilateral diplomacy than his immediate
predecessors had. He announced his firm support for and commitment to the
UN. The early actions of the Carter administration yielded impressive results in
its human rights and other foreign policies: the Panama Canal treaties; improved
Third World relationships in Africa and Latin America; Andrew Young’s leadership
in the United Nations; the Camp David peace accords between Israel and Egypt;
and establishment of official diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of
China. President Carter, elected largely in protest against traditional Washington
politics, Richard Nixon, and the Watergate Scandal, set ambitious foreign and
domestic policy agendas. Carter sought a moral foreign policy that would
harmonize American strategic objectives with professed beliefs in justice, peace,
protection of human rights, and nuclear arms control.
By 1978, however, the Carter administration was sending mixed signals.
Carter’s moral-based foreign policy at times conflicted with the US economic
interests such as extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) status to the Soviet
Union. Christmas-time 1979 presented Carter with one of his most challenging
57

dilemmas, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, the Carter
administration’s foreign policy moved from the early progressive position to the
nationalist position based on tension of the relationship between the USSR and
the US. By the end of Carter’s term, confrontation, not cooperation, seemed the
hallmark of international affairs.
By the change of its original progressive position into the nationalist
one, the case of the Carter administration shows a failure to reconcile between
human rights policy and national security concerns. The Carter administration
started with human rights policy as a major goal of the US foreign policy. At that
time, absolute gains pursuit based on neoliberalism provided a more important
understanding of Carter’s foreign policy. However, the unstable world
environment changed the priority of national interests in foreign policy decisionmaking. Therefore, security acquired more significance than before. With a
higher sense of threat from the world environment, the Carter administration lost
the balance between human rights concerns and national security matters. As a
result, security matters were emphasized more than in the early years. In this
context, the positions of the Carter administration were seriously influenced by
the external environment and changed priority of national interests based on
gains pursuit.
Both the nationalist options (realist idea) and progressive options
(liberalism/neoliberalism idea) Carter took during that period can be explained by
both major perspectives of international relations. The sense of threat is a key
element in understanding this mechanism between the world environment and
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the decision-maker’s foreign policy decisions. To acquire a more comprehensive
understanding of the dynamics of the world system and the state choice, more
detailed synthetic and systemic approaches from both realism and neoliberalism
are needed for further development of the study in the area of international
relations.
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Chapter V

The Cases of China (1971-1983)

This chapter compares Mao Tse-Tung’s decision-making outputs to Deng
Xiao-Ping’s. The case of China (1971-1983) is very useful for understanding the
interaction between the world system and the individual decision-maker. During
Mao’s era, the world system was unbalanced. That situation led Mao to pursue
relative gains with the goal of maintaining security. Balance of power had
important meanings at that point. On the other hand, economic development and
absolute gains were more important during Deng’s era. At that time, the world
system was much more settled than it was in Mao’s era, and the decisionmaker’s sense of threat was not significant. With close examination of the case of
China, this chapter will suggest several possible answers which can fully explain
the relationship between the world system and gains pursuits.

Two main hypotheses are examined in this chapter:

I. When the sense of threat from world environment is high, the decision-maker
tries to take nationalist options (based on perspective of realism). In this case,
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most foreign policy decision-making would focus more on security matters and
would pursue relative gains. To gain equilibrium in power in the world system and
to escape an existing unfavorable environment, the decision-maker tries to
change the status quo through relative gains concerns. Foreign compliance to
rules, institutions, and moral values is required only when fundamental security
matters are threatened. Various issues in international relations conglomerate
around security matters (high politics). When the world environment around
China was unsettled during Mao’s period, China’s foreign policy was concerned
with relative gains and maintaining security.

II. When the sense of threat from world environment is low, the decision-maker
tries to keep this favorable status quo and becomes more sensitive to economic
gains, cooperation, and compliance to rule and value through international
regime and absolute gains pursuit. Therefore, low sense of threat from the stable
world environment around China led Deng to focus on economic development
and absolute gains (based on perspective of neoliberalism).

The relationship between the world system and gains pursuit in the cases
of China can be illustrated in the following FIGURE 5-1.

The general world environment can be described as a balanced situation
and an unbalanced situation relative to the ‘status quo.’ The relationship between
the US and the USSR is also considered as an independent variable with the
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notion of tension and détente because the major diplomatic targets of China’s
foreign policy were both superpowers.
The dependent variable (Y) of this study is China’s foreign policies which
are concerned with absolute gains and relative gains. The relationship between
the world environment (X) and foreign policies concerned with absolute gains and
relative gains (Y) can be examined by qualitative analysis which reflects decision
makers’ positions with their cognitive aspects such as sense of crisis and sense
of equilibrium. Moreover, this chapter will be based on event and policy position
analysis to examine the relationship between decision-makers’ perception of
external environment and foreign policy. For this purpose, various government
statements and documents will be analyzed.
China has issued many official statements which express its positions
and diplomatic actions to the outer world. According to Barnett, official
statements and publications from influential Chinese news outlets such as The
People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) play important roles in China’s foreign policy.
Moreover, the The People’s Daily takes the role of a special agency which
represents China’s positions to the outer world (Barnett 1985, 111-9).
Therefore, for qualitative case analysis, the data informing this research
are based on the official statements, constitutions, government publications, Mao
and Deng’s addresses, major articles of the organ paper of the Communist party,
and The Beijing Review providing an English translation of The People’s Daily.
In the next section, three major aspects of the decision-maker’s sense of
threat and the world environment will be discussed. Those aspects are 1) the
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world environment around China, and the world environment based on the
relationship between the US and the USSR, 2) rhetoric and actions, and 3) the
mechanism and relationships between environment and the decision-maker’s
rhetoric and actions.

1. Mao’s Era

World Environment around China

The world environment around China as an independent variable which has
an effect on China’s decision-making and establishing ‘anti-hegemonism’ can be
described as follows:

In the late 1960s, the world environment around China was very unstable and
complicated. In this state of flux, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR in
1968 and the conflict over the national border between China and the USSR in
1969 convinced China that the expanding power of the USSR was very
dangerous. This situation gave a sense of crisis to China.
Mao’s statement on May 20, 1970 suggests the major positions of China
at that time.

The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all
countries must get prepared... It will be possible to prevent such a war, so
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long as the peoples, who are becoming more and more awakened, keep
the orientation clearly in sight, heighten their vigilance, strengthen unity
and preserve in struggle... We should be fully prepared against any war of
aggression that imperialism may launch and particularly against surprise
attack on our country by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. Our heroic
people’s Liberation Army and our vast militia must be prepared at all times
to wipe out any enemy that may invade (Peking Review September 7,
1973, 23-4).

The position of China in the world environment around China in late 1960s
and early 1970s was well expressed in the UN meeting in 1972. According to an
address by the chairman of the Chinese Delegation, Chiao Kuan-Hua, the world
environment around China was made unstable by the expanding hegemony of
the superpowers (Peking Review October 13, 1972, 4-9). Hua Chih-Hai, a
theorist of China, predicted that these tensions would increase and the
competition for hegemony would cause extensive disruption and disorder in the
world in 1972 (Peking Review December 1, 1972, 5-7). According to an editorial
of the Peking Review, “the US-Soviet contention for hegemony is the cause of
world intranquility” (Peking Review September 7, 1973, 22; emphasis added).
Chou En-Lai expressed the same position on the world environment in the Tenth
National Congress of the Communist party of China on August 28, 1973.
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The present international situation is one characterized by great
disorder on the earth. “The wind sweeping through the tower heralds a
rising storm in the mountains.” This aptly depicts how the basic world
contradictions as analyzed by Lenin show themselves today. Relaxation is
temporary and superficial phenomenon, and great disorder will continue
(Peking Review September 7, 1973, 22-4).

World Environment based on the Relationship between the US and the
USSR

However, the US and the USSR started talks promoting a better relationship
in 1970. In March 1970, there was a conference between two superpowers on
the status of Berlin. After that, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
between two superpowers was held in Vienna and Helsinki. Both superpowers
approached détente (Stoessinger 1975, 179-80). This détente was made official
by Breznev in the 24th Communist Congress in April 1971. He emphasized the
importance of the improved relationship between the US and the USSR.
Therefore, the movements between the US and the USSR during that period,
1969 and 1970, gave advance notice of their future cooperation for balance of
power in the world.
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China worried that this détente might create long-term isolation of China from
the outer world by the collusion of both superpowers (Kim 1988, 72).
The Peking Review on September 7, 1973 suggested China’s position on the
relationship between the superpowers.

Today, it is mainly the two nuclear superpowers- the US and the USSRthat are contending for hegemony. While hawking disarmament, they are
actually expanding their armaments every day. Their purpose is to
contend for world hegemony. They contend as well as collude with each
other. Their Collusion serves the purpose of more intensified contention...
It has met with strong resistance from the Third World (Peking Review
September 7, 1973, 22-3).

Therefore, China felt the need for a new doctrine which opposed the
superpowers and emphasized the support and unification of the third world.
Deng’s address in the UN (April 1974) clearly defined China’s positions on both
superpowers and the third world.

Every day, they (both superpowers) talk about ‘détente’ but are actually
creating tension...(Therefore) there will be no ‘lasting peace.’... It is not the
one or two superpowers that are really powerful; the really powerful are
the Third World and the people of all countries uniting together and daring
to fight and daring to win (Peking Review April 12, 1974, 1-5).
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Rhetoric and Actions: Anti-hegemonism

The process of establishing the official definition of ‘anti-hegemonism’ as a
doctrine started from January 23, 1971. After that, ‘anti-hegemonism’ became a
main term of official statements which expressed the positions of China to the
outer world. This doctrine was ideologically justified by Lenin’s remark quoted by
Chou En-Lai at the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on
August 28, 1973.

Lenin said that “an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry
between several Great Powers in the striving for hegemony.” Today, it is
mainly the two nuclear superpowers- the US and the USSR (Peking
Review September 7, 1973, 22).

This ‘anti-hegemonism’ was elucidated as the most important part of the
foreign policy of China in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China by the
Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1973.

The Communist Party of China upholds proletarian internationalism and
opposes great-power chauvinism. It fights together with the people and
nations of the whole world to oppose the hegemonism of the two
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superpowers- the United States and the Soviet Union (Peking Review
September 7, 1973, 26).

Deng Xiao-Ping’s address on anti-hegemonism in the UN meeting (April
1974) has significant meaning as a proclamation of the position of China to the
outer world. Moreover, Mao’s ‘Three World Theory’ was also delivered by Deng
at that time. According to Deng, the world environment was chaotic and there
was no harmony as long as there is hegemonism of two superpowers as the First
World. He argued that this hegemonism had also aroused strong dissatisfaction
among the developed countries of the Second World and serious political and
economic crises among developing countries of the Third World.

More and more, the old order based on colonialism, imperialism and
hegemonism is being undermined and shaken to its (international
situation) foundations. International relations are changing drastically. The
whole world is in turbulence and unrest. The situation is one of ‘great
disorder under heaven,’ as we Chinese put it. This ‘disorder’ is a
manifestation of the sharpening of all the basic contradictions in the
contemporary world....The two superpowers are the biggest international
exploiters and oppressors of today...So long as imperialism and social
imperialism exist, there definitely will be no tranquility in the world, nor will
there be ‘lasting peace’ (Peking Review April 12, 1974, 1-5).

68

In 1975, the preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China
indicated the importance of ‘anti-hegemonism,’ a point which was also
emphasized in the New Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in
February 1978.

Therefore, the establishment of the official definition of ‘anti-hegemonism’ as
the operational code of the foreign policy can be summarized by major official
statements in the following:

1971 editorial of Renmin Ribao ( the organ paper
of the Communist Party)
1973 Constitution of the Communist Party of China
1974 Deng’s UN address
1975 Constitution of the People’s republic of China
1978 New Constitution of the People’s Republic of
China

Goals of Decision-Making

As mentioned above, the world environment around China can be
characterized as an unbalanced situation. On the other hand, the world
environment based on the relationship between the US and the USSR can be
characterized as détente. For this reason, the world environment as independent
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variable can be generally described as unbalance-oriented tension reduction. In
this situation, China tried to keep a symmetrical relationship with the outer world
by challenging both superpowers and emphasizing the support and unification of
the third world. Therefore, China wanted a new strategy to achieve its two major
goals: (1) interception of expanding power of the USSR and (2) enhancement of
its status in the third world (Kim 1988, 73). For these goals, ‘anti-hegemonism’
was suggested as a useful means which satisfied the need for new diplomatic
principle. Moreover, it could be ideologically justified by Lenin’s remark on
hegemonism. Mao’s ‘Third World Theory’ was also used to reinforce antihegemonism.
This doctrine, ‘anti-hegemonism,’ was mainly focused on keeping security in
Mao’s era.

2. Deng’s Era

World Environment around China

The world environment around China as an independent variable which has
an effect on China’s decision-making and establishing the doctrine, ‘practical
independent diplomatic doctrine’ can be described as follows:
Through the normalization of the diplomatic relationship between China and
the US in 1979, China was confident about national security because of their
anti-USSR strategy of cooperation with the US and Japan (Kim 1988, 351).
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Moreover, the USSR did not take military actions in response to the invasion of
Vietnam because of apprehensions about the cooperation among the three
countries. Concerning the invasion of Afghanistan, China did not directly react
but made an indirect response because they thought that China was not the
focus of interest of the USSR any longer, and that invasion was not a dangerous
sign for China (The Guardia September 21, 1980, 17-8).
Leonid I. Breznev admitted China as a socialist state and argued the
importance of improvement of the relationship in the Tashkent Declaration on
March 24th, 1982. In this situation, China did not want to irritate the USSR by the
term ‘social-imperialism’ and ‘revisionism.’ Therefore, these terms were
eliminated in the official statements of China.
The possibility of war with the USSR was ignored in the position of China
(Pollack 1982, 35). The reason for this position became obvious by the fact that
the USSR did not take military actions when China attacked Vietnam in 1979.
Moreover, the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR was not interpreted as a
danger to China in 1980. Mu In said that the provocation of war from the USSR
would be controlled by the balance of nuclear weapons in World Information on
January 16, 1981 (World Information January 16, 1981, 15). The decision
makers of China took this world environment as a more stable situation than
Mao’s era and felt the need for a more stable and peaceful environment for the
successful achievement of the modernization program. According to Dong-Sung
Kim, Deng was satisfied by the existing cooperation with the US, Japan and
China until 1981 (Kim 1988, 248). On this basis, Deng wanted to pursue
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reconciliation with the USSR to eliminate insecurity and maintain a peaceful
environment.

World Environment based on the relationship between the US and the
USSR

However, the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in 1979 increased tension
between the US and the USSR. Moreover, Reagan’s new government took a
hard-line attitude against the USSR and China from 1981. This situation caused
the ‘new cold war’ era between the USSR and the US. In this situation with
increased tension, China realized that the former doctrine, ‘anti-hegemonism,’
was unfit for this new world environment. Therefore, China felt the need for a
new strategy to keep a good relationship with the US, and approached both
superpowers with equidistant diplomacy to maintain stability which enabled
economic development through the modernization program.

Rhetoric and Actions: Practical Independent Diplomatic Doctrine

The establishment of Deng Xiao-Ping’s ‘practical independent diplomatic
doctrine’ as an official diplomatic principle was proclaimed on September first,
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1982.16 This doctrine was also made official in the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China.

The basic task of the nation in the years to come is to concentrate its
effort on socialist modernization ... China adheres to an independent
foreign policy as well as to the five principles of mutual respect for
sovereignty

and

territorial

integrity,

mutual

non-aggression,

non-

interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit,
and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic
and cultural exchanges with other countries (Beijing Review December 27,
1982, 10-1).

Dong-Sung Kim said that the constitution contained the implication that this
‘practical independent diplomatic doctrine’ as a modification of existing principle
would replace ‘anti-hegemonism’ (Kim 1988, 231). One of the significant facts in
the new constitution is that the terms, ‘social imperialism’ and ‘revisionism’ as the
key words of attack against the USSR were eliminated. This fact is relevant to a
remark made by Seo Shin, vice president of ‘the research institute of strategy’ in
Beijing, that an all out attack from the USSR was impossible (Pollack 1982, 35).

See “Deng’s Speech in the Twelfth National Congress on the Communist Party
of China” (printed in Renmin Ribao September 8, 1982).
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Goals of Decision-Making

As mentioned above, the world environment around China can be
characterized as balanced. On the other hand, the world environment based on
the relationship between the US and the USSR can be characterized as
increased tension.
In this situation, the ‘practical independent diplomatic doctrine’ was
officially established for two major goals: (1) building up the peaceful
environment and, (2) the successful achievement of the modernization program
for economic development.
To gain economic and technical support from Japan and the US, and to
pursue reconciliation with the USSR, China wanted to keep a symmetrical
relationship with both superpowers. For those purposes, Deng’s ‘practical
independent diplomatic doctrine’ was used as a helpful means in China’s foreign
policy.
This doctrine, ‘practical independent diplomatic doctrine,’ was mainly focused
on the economic development in Deng’s era.

3. The Relationship between the World Environment and Doctrines

In the late 1960s, when the relationship between the US and the USSR
approached détente, the remarks or official statements which express ‘antihegemonism’ were tough and resolute. Some expressions, such as “defeat to the
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US imperialism, social imperialism, and revisionism” (in the 12th Plenum of
Eighth C.C. of the C.P.C. August, 22, 1968), were very aggressive to both
superpowers.17 In the conflict over the national border between China and the
USSR, China recognized that the environment around China was unstable.
Because China worried that détente might create a long term isolation of China
from the outer world by the collusion of the superpowers, China tried to
overcome this situation by taking a hard line which is effective for restricting the
expanding power of the superpowers and enhancing its status in the third world.
On the other hand, in the early 1980s, when the relationship between the US
and the USSR was in a high state of tension, China did not want to stimulate
both superpowers. Therefore, China stopped using the terms ‘imperialism’ and
‘revisionism,’ and approached both superpowers by equidistant diplomacy and an
appeasement policy for maintaining the peaceful environment which was
required to achieve their modernization program.
In China, personality was not a significant variable affecting the creating
and changing doctrine, because Deng Xiao-Ping emphasized the importance of
the existing ‘anti-hegemonism’ of Mao and reinforced the application of that
doctrine in the early period of his reign. However, he changed doctrine when it
appeared that the existing doctrine which took a tough line on both superpowers
did not fit the new world environment around China and the new relationship
between superpowers.
In the 12th Plenum of Eighth C.C. of the C.P.C. on 22 August 1968 (printed in
Peking Review August 23, 1968, viii).
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Moreover, ideology was also not a significant variable to establishing doctrine
in China. This is proved by Deng’s UN address in April 1974. He said that the
‘communist camp’ does not exist anymore. According to Deng, there are the
three worlds: two superpowers, Europe as the second world and the third world
countries as the main force which fights hegemonism of two superpowers
(Peking Review April 12, 1974, 1-5). During the conflict over the national border
between China and the USSR, China criticized the USSR with the term
‘revisionism’ until the early 1980s. However, China was also criticized with the
same term by the USSR at the same time. Therefore, in China’s anti-USSR
campaign, ideological propaganda was not an effective means. Moreover, after
softening the relationship between China and the USSR, the ideologically
aggressive term ‘revisionism’ was eliminated from official remarks and
statements by China.
In this case, ideology had a function of justification which supports the
doctrine and decision for the pursuit of national interest rather than having a
purpose in itself. In fact, Lenin’s remark on hegemonism was used effectively as
an ideological basis for Mao’s ‘anti-hegemonism’ doctrine and his position
against the two superpowers.
Both doctrines are rational responses by China in decision-making on foreign
policy. They have a function of justification for the decision-makers’ rational
choices. For both doctrines, as the rational and practical strategies of China, it
was required to adjust to the balance and unbalance, tension and détente of
world environment as the significant variables. For this reason, the approach
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based on the typology of personality or ideology which characterizes past
research of China’s foreign policy and doctrine has to be complemented with the
gains pursuit approach to explain the various functions and meanings of doctrine.
As a new framework, the world environment can be considered as one of the
significant variables affecting the creating and changing of doctrine. This fact can
be well explained by the case of China. Moreover, in this framework, former
foreign policy actions can have an effect on doctrine, because doctrine is a useful
means for justifying a decision maker’s former actions with rational calculations.
This justification can be used to integrate the various inner opinions, to propagate
their former decisions, and to gain support from the external world.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, the relationship between the dynamics of the world system
and the decision-makers’ gains pursuit have been explained through the case of
China. The conclusion of this study can be suggested in the following:
During Mao’s era, the world environment was significantly unstable.
Qualitative case analysis of official statements, constitutions, government
publications and major articles of the organ paper of the Communist party shows
that the decision-maker’s sense of crisis was significant at that time. In this
context, China’s decision-making was focused on maintaining security and
relative gains. On the other hand, during Deng’s era, the world environment
around China was much more settled than that of Mao’s era. China’s perceptions
77

and positions on the world environment were well expressed in official
statements and decision maker’s addresses. At that time, China’s decisionmaker ignored the possibility of war caused by superpowers and was confident
about security (Pollack 1982, 35). The world environment was not interpreted as
dangerous at that time.
Although both leaders, Mao and Deng, differently pursued relative gains
and absolute gains, their decision-making was based on the orientation for
rationality. Both leaders successfully achieved their diplomatic goals based on
national interest: maintaining security and developing economic status. In this
case, the sense of crisis which is explicitly expressed in their official statements
during Mao’s era did not hamper the decision-maker’s choice as proper strategy.
On the contrary, this sense of crisis helped the decision-maker deploy a rational
strategy to accuse both superpowers and to gain the cooperation of and
unification with the third world. From this point of view, Snidal’s argument that
relative gains do not limit international cooperation can be supported. In the case
of China during Mao’s era, decision-making concerned with relative gains and
maintaining security and balance drew international cooperation from the third
world. This cooperation had important meaning for relative balance in China’s
foreign policy because China tried to avoid a possible danger from the expansion
of power of both superpowers.
With the close examination of the case of China, this study provides four
conclusions in the following:
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1) Both relative and absolute gains pursuits are based on the decision-makers’
assessment of the world environments and 2) the sense of threat does not
always hamper their decision-making process for proper strategies. 3) However,
the sense of threat has a direct effect on relative gains. 4) Therefore, without
consideration of the sense of threat which comes from the world environment,
the existing dichotomy between absolute gains and relative gains cannot fully
explain foreign policy.
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Chapter VI
The Cases of MD and PNTR (1998-2000)

This chapter aims to explain the relationship between the medium level of
threat and the decision-maker’s response with regard to gains pursuit. With the
focus on the Clinton administration (1998-2000), this chapter will examine the
development of the ‘Permanent Normal Trade Relations’ (PNTR) agreement and
the ‘National Defense’ (MD) plan, and their strategic implications on the basis of
the relationship between China and the US.
According to Joseph Biden, “The world is in transition from old Cold War
alignments to new patterns of conflict and cooperation.”18 The cases of the MD
plan and the PNTR agreement were two major issues for the Clinton
Administration during 1998-2000 and are good examples to show these new
patterns of conflict and cooperation after the Cold War. With these cases, we can
understand how relative and absolute gains, security and economic matters, and
short-term and long-term gains pursuit collide with each other under the medium
sense of threat after the Cold War.

18

“Missile Defense Delusion,” The Washington Post, December 19, 2001.
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Although US administration officials universally declare that the new missile
defense (MD) plan would be directed at threats from North Korea and Iran, most
analysts believe the US missile defense program is directed at China. Shen
Dingli stated, “Even if the United States says the system is directed at China, the
capability is aimed at China.”19 The US was seen as trying to maintain world
hegemony and dominate East Asia by containing a rising China. The case of the
MD plan clearly reflects a security dilemma and long-term relative gains issues
around the US and China. The case of MD can be well explained by a realist
perspective.
On the other hand, the case of PNTR shows absolute short-term economic
gains pursuit of both countries under a medium sense of threat from the world
system. To China, the PNTR agreement was an important prior step before being
a member of WTO, an international regime. With the PNTR agreement, the US
would decrease the risk of unpredictability in its trade relationship with China. A
neoliberal perspective could be a useful theoretical framework for this PNTR
case to understand the gains pursuit of the Clinton administration.
In this chapter, the hypotheses introduced in the second chapter will be
examined with the discussion about the MD plan, the PNTR agreement, other
conflicting claims about security and human rights, and theoretical implications
from realism and neoliberalism with regard to the decision-making of the Clinton
administration.

Quoted in Erik Eckholm, “What America Calls a Defense, China Calls an
Offense,” New York Times, July 2, 2000, p. WK3.
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1. The MD Plan

In this section, the development, the strategic implications, and the
relative gains pursuit of the MD plan in the era of the Clinton administration
during 1998-2000 will be discussed.

The Development of the MD Plan

There are several levels of missile defense. Lower-tier theater missile
defense (TMD) weapons, such as the Patriot, attempt to intercept shorter-range
missiles as they descend toward their targets. Upper-tier TMD weapons aim to
intercept missiles which are still above the atmosphere, thus protecting wider
areas of territory.
National missile defense (NMD) focuses on defending North America from
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Unlike the more ambitious SDI (Star
Wars) program promoted by the Reagan Administration, the NMD proposal of the
Clinton Administration would have deployed interceptors on North American soil
to protect against a small number of ICBMs. This new missile defense would use
space-based sensors, early warning radars and missiles based in North Dakota
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or Alaska to shoot down no more than a handful of missiles from rogue states or
terrorists.20
In August 1997, members of a congressionally chartered panel chaired by
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were named to “examine the
current and potential missile threat to all 50 States and to assess that capability
of the US intelligence community to warn policymakers of changes in this
threat.”21
The Rumsfeld Report appeared in July 1998 and characterized the threat to
the US in three blunt paragraphs:

Ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic
threat to the United States. This is not a distant threat. Characterizing
foreign assistance as a wild card is both incorrect and misleading.
Foreign assistance is pervasive, enabling and misleading....
A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile
powers that capacity, through a combination of domestic development
and foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the US within
about five years of decision to acquire such a capacity (10 years in the
case of Iraq). During several of these years, the United States might
not be aware that such a decision had been made....

The New York Times January 24, 1999.
Daniel Smith, “Chronology of US National Missile Defense Programs,” Center
for Defense Information, (http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch9/index.html)
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21

The threat is exacerbated by the ability of both existing and
emerging ballistic missile powers to hide their activities from the US and
to deceive the US about the pace, scope, and direction of their
development and proliferation programs.

In addition to its comments about the threat to the American
homeland, the commission’s conclusions suggested an acceleration of the
missile threat in general, including theater ballistic missiles. In the words of the
report: “Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to
acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing
threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies.” In fact,
the commission said, “The threat to the US posed by these emerging capabilities
is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in
estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.”
Six weeks after the Rumsfeld Report appeared, as if cued by the release
of that report, the North Koreans tested a three-stage missile that passed over
the islands of Japan. This test of 31 August 1998 surprised the Intelligence
Community and seemed to confirm the position of those who emphasized the
threats to the US. 22

22

“National Missile Defense: An Overview (1993-2000),”
(http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/nmdhist.html)
84

The White House report in 1999 shows a long-term concern on relative
security with regard to the ICBM threat from East Asia.

We are committed to meeting the growing danger posed by
nations developing and deploying long-range missiles that could deliver
weapons of mass destruction against the United States. Informed by
the Intelligence Community’s analysis of the August 1998 North Korea
flight test of its Taepo Dong I missile, as well as the report of the
Rumsfeld Commission and other information, the administration has
concluded that the threat posed by a rogue state developing an ICBM
capable of striking the United States is growing. The Intelligence
Community estimates that during the next fifteen years the United
States will most likely face an ICBM threat from North Korea, probably
from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. We intend to determine in 2000
whether to deploy a limited national missile defense against ballistic
missile threats to the United States from rogue states.23

In January 1999, a new MD plan was announced by the Pentagon.

23

“The President’s Articulation to the US Congress of American Strategic
Objectives,” White House 1999, p. 16.
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Strategic Implications Based on Long-term Relative Gains

The United States has the largest and most formidable nuclear and
conventional arsenals of any nations on earth. Nevertheless, the US hopes to
protect itself with a missile-proof umbrella. It claims that it wants to prevent ‘rogue
states,’ such as North Korea, from attacking it, and it wants to be able to intercept
unauthorized missiles originating from Russia and China.
However, it will take a long time for North Korea to acquire a realistic longrange ballistic missile capacity. Some analysts argue that the actual effect of a
US missile defense system would be to deny China a strategic deterrent (The
planned system would not have enough interceptors to knock down Russia’s
strategic weapons, but it could possibly nullify China’s strategic retaliatory
arsenal).24
TMD and NMD proposals are more intricately linked than is often
recognized. Although a key locus of these linkages in the Asia-Pacific region is
China, the impact of proposed missile defenses on China is not sufficiently
recognized. 25
The strategic implications of both NMD and TMD over China fall generally
into three categories. Though many analysts doubt that China could successfully
invade Taiwan to suppress independence, Taiwan is clearly vulnerable to China’s

24

Shen, Dingli. 2000. “What Missile Defense Says to China,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 4.
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short-range missile force. Deployment of TMD in or near Taiwan would reduce
China’s ability to use missile threats to politically intimidate Taiwan’s leaders.
Moreover, any US role in such deployment would signal (to both Taipei and
Beijing) a great likelihood of US military support of Taiwan in the event of overt
conflict.
The second strategic implication is the impact of TMD in East Asia. The US
and Japan were collaborating to develop TMD to protect Japanese targets
against regional missile attacks, most specifically from North Korea. Chinese
analysts were not persuaded that the North Korea threat was so grave, and so
US-Japan TMD collaboration exacerbated Chinese fears that both countries
sought less constraint to act against China. The strengthening of the US-Japan
Defense Guidelines, which conspicuously failed to define the geographic
boundaries within which events could lead to joint US-Japan military operations,
underscored this Chinese perception.
These two concerns are directly linked. US-Japan TMD planning favored
the NTW system, which would be deployed on Aegis cruisers that could be
moved near Taiwan in the event of a conflict there. Hence, for China, NTW
deployment in Japan would provide implicit TMD protection to Taiwan. Chinese
leaders additionally worried that such deployment, combined with the openended regional scope of the US-Japan defense guidelines, would open the door
to direct Japanese involvement in a China-Taiwan conflict.

Huntley, Wade and Robert Brown, 2001. “Missile Defense and China” Foreign
Policy in Focus Vol. 6, No. 3.
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The third strategic implication focuses on US NMD plans. China was
undertaking long-term modernization and expansion of its strategic nuclear
forces, which US strategic analysts perceived as a latent threat. Still, China’s
nuclear force will remain relatively small, and the US will retain a massive
retaliation deterrent. Therefore, even in the event of direct US-China military
conflict, the prospects of China launching nuclear missiles against the US will
remain slim. Nevertheless, China’s nuclear capabilities were politically a
meaningful coercive instrument, because China’s strategic global role in the postcold war world was rapidly growing.
China was often depicted as a big ‘rogue’ state or potential adversary whose
motives were inscrutable and whose actions the US cannot influence but whose
threat could be defeated by military actions.26
China has been a largely reactive international power for most of the
period beginning 1949 with the formation of the Communist state, willingly--and
often skillfully--playing the pivot in the strategic competition of other states. In the
years since Beijing’s 1996 missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait, China has been
perceived as a major variable which might bring changes for the future balance
of power in the world.
Nothing is likely to prove as damaging to US-China relations as the
indications of massive Chinese penetration of US security and theft of top-secret
Berry, Nicholas. “US National Missile Defense: Views from Asia” on the Center
for Defense Information website
(http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch7/index.html).
26
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nuclear weapons data. Enough information about the preliminary findings of a
Congressional investigation had leaked prior to Premier Zhu Rongji’s arrival in
Washington to prompt President Clinton to address the embarrassing revelations
and try to put them in a broader and long-term context.
Known as the Cox Report, the Report of the House Select Committee on
US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with China documented
China’s systemic policy of spying.27 A few of the findings are:

• China’s penetration of US national weapons laboratories spans at least the past
several decades and almost certainly continues today.
• The stolen information includes classified information on seven US
thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear
warhead in the US ballistic missile arsenal.
• The Select Committee judges that elements of the stolen information on US
thermonuclear warhead designs will assist China in building its next generation of
mobile ICBMs, which may be tested in 1999.
• In the late 1990s, China stole or illegally obtained US developmental and
research technology that, if taken to a successful conclusion, could be used to
attack US satellites and submarines.

See also Huntley, Wade and Robert Brown, “Missile Defense and China” Foreign
Policy in Focus, Vol. 6, No. 3, January 2001.
27
It was made public on May 25, 1999. The Committee’s chairman was
Christopher Cox.
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China’s objection to theater missile defense (TMD) systems had been
particularly strenuous, in large part because Beijing explicitly linked TMD to the
possibility of dramatically enhanced US-Taiwan defense cooperation, as well as
to new forms of Japanese power projection. Joint US-Japan TMD development,
especially of naval theater-wide systems deployable to ocean-going ships,
speaks directly to China’s argument that the US-Japan alliance had become a
cover for an increasingly independent Japanese force projection capability. In
addition to its narrowly technical role as a potential force multiplier, TMD
threatens to revive a formal US-Taiwan defense relationship that Beijing had
insisted be abrogated as one of the main preconditions to the normalization of
diplomatic relations with the US in 1979. China viewed the prospect of Taiwan
participation in TMD development as symbolic evidence of the de facto
reestablishment of a US-Taiwan military alliance.

2. The PNTR Agreement

Short-term Absolute Gains Pursuit

President Clinton said PNTR represented the most significant opportunity
that the United States had had to create positive changes in China since
President Nixon’s visit there in the early 1970s.
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As a means of developing support for permanent NTR for China, Clinton
administration officials had been speaking to diverse constituencies-- such as
agricultural interests and business associations-- on the benefits to be gained by
getting Congress to vote for permanent NTR for China.28
There is no doubt that this agreement was an opportunity for American
businesses, workers and farmers. It would provide unprecedented access to a
largely untapped market of over one billion consumers.

By granting China

PNTR, the US would gain significant tariff cuts across the board--some as high
as 20 percent-- on virtually all US goods as well as substantial improvements in
market access for US services. The benefits for the US are widespread, including
significant opportunities for small and medium size businesses.
Meng Yan noted in the official, English-language China Daily.

Hailing it a historic win for the US economy, US businesspeople
said passage of a bill granting China PNTR status by the US House of
representatives paved the way for US companies to benefit from
China’s accession to the WTP. Many firms believe PNTR will result in

28

Secretary Albright, Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, Agricultural
Secretary Glickman, and United States Trade Representative Ambassador
Charlene Barshefsky, Secretary of Commerce William Daley, and Ambassador
David Aaron discussed the economic benefits of the PNTR agreement to the US
(http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106s/daley0503.htm).
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the generation of billions of dollars in US exports to China, creating
more opportunities for US companies and more jobs for US workers.29

Although there was grim anticipation from media and the opponents of PNTR
suggesting that US workers were losing jobs as a result of trade with China,
Michael J. Copps, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Development,
argued that far more jobs in US would be created by the expansion of trade than
would be lost.30

The process of granting PNTR can be summarized as follows:

• On May 24, 2000, the US House of Representative passed legislation to grant
PNTR with China.
• On July 18, 2000, the House voted 281-147 to extend normal trade relations
(NTR) status to China for another year. This ensured that China would be
granted NTR until it became a member of the WTO, which was expected to occur
later.
• On September19, 2000, the Senate granted PNTR to China.
• On October 10, 2000, President Clinton granted PNTR to China.

China Daily, May 18, 2000.
From “Remarks of Michael J. Copps, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Trade development” US department of Commerce to the China Trade 2000
Seminar, Minneapolis, Minnesota October 17, 2000
(www.ita.doc.gov/media/Speeches/coppsminn.htm).

29

30
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This section highlights the administration’s effort to emphasize various
benefits and gains from the PNTR agreement. Their speeches and interviews
show how they articulated a decidedly alternative vision of the underlying
principles of international relations. With the issue of the PNTR agreement, the
relationship with China was described as stable and mutually beneficial within the
theoretical framework of neorealism, which focuses on the predictability,
cooperation and the rule of international regimes.
The President and administration officials had asked Congress to support
extending normal trade relations for China, arguing it would benefit US workers
and consumers. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had called the House
vote “the right decision for America.” In addition, President Clinton stated “it
(PNTR) will open new doors of trade for America and new hope for Change in
China.”31
William M. Daley said, “ A few months ago when President Clinton asked me
to lead the administration’s efforts to seek Congressional approval of PNTR, I
discovered that there was a lot of misunderstanding about what the vote on
PNTR means.... As President Clinton has stated, we must understand the
consequences of saying ‘no’.... We now face another history-making foreign

A fact sheet released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State,
May 24, 2000.
31
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policy choices, identified by President Clinton as his top remaining foreign policy
goal.”32
According to David Aaron, Under Secretary of Commerce for International
Trade, the US would gain in two distinct ways with the passage of PNTR and
China WTO membership:33

Small Businesses

Aaron argued that PNTR would allow American businesses- most
importantly small and medium sized businesses- greater access to the world’s
greatest emerging market.

According to the Chinese government, China’s gross domestic product
reached $ 1,07 trillion in 2000, up 8 percent over the previous year. The US
bilateral trade deficit with China had also reached a record level. In 2000, it
approached a record $ 84 billion, with China overtaking Japan as the trading
partner with which the US had the largest bilateral deficit. Though imports of
Chinese goods continued to grow, 2000 also was a very good year for US
exports to China. US exports to China topped $ 16 billion, almost 24 percent
greater than in 1999.
32

Daley, William, 2000. “Testimony of William M. Daley before the House
Agriculture Committee,” May 17, 2000
(http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106s/daley0517.htm).
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In 1998 (the most recent year for which detailed numbers are available),
over 8,400 small and medium-sized US companies exported to China. Small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) represented over 80 percent of the total
number of US firms exporting to China, and accounted for over $ 3 billion in
exports to China, or over a quarter of the total by value.34
The number of small firms participating in the Chinese market has been
growing at a rapid rate: between 1992 and 1998, the number of SMEs exporting
to the Chinese market grew by more than two and one-half times. Over the 19921998 period, China was the tenth largest growth market for SME exporters. 35
• Industrial Goods
China agreed to cut tariffs from an average of 24.6 percent to an average
of 9.4 percent overall and 7.1 percent on US priority products. China would make
substantial cuts immediately with further cuts phased in, most within five years.
These cuts would benefit a wide range of US products from automobiles, to
chemicals to wood products. China would also eliminate all import quotas and
non-automatic licensing requirements for industrial goods. For example, China

33

“Remarks of Ambassador David L. Aaron: Keynote Address to the Economic
Strategy Institute’s Panel on China/PNTR.” Washington D.C., March 2, 2000.
34
Peter B. Hale, Acting Assistant secretary, US Department of Commerce,
“PNTR/WTO: A Good Deal for US Small Businesses in China,” US Senate
Committee on Small Business, March 7, 2000.
35
At a plenary session of the US-China Joins Commission on Commerce and
Trade (JCCT), US premier bilateral consultative forum to discuss these issues,
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would participate in the Information Technology Agreement, eliminating tariffs
and quotas on information technology products such as semiconductors,
telecommunications equipment, computers and computer equipment and other
items by 2003, in most cases, and 2005 in a few others. In April, 2000, nearly
200 high tech industry CEOs wrote to members of Congress urging support for
PNTR for China and identifying it as “an absolute priority for high-tech
companies...” and the “... most critical vote you will make in support of our high
technology industries this year.”36

• Services
This agreement does substantially more than lower tariffs. Equally
important to US industry is the agreement by China to allow US firms to engage
in trade (importing and exporting) and the full range of distribution services
including wholesale, retail, repair and transport, for their products in China.37
China made significant commitments to phase out most restrictions in a
broad range of service sectors in addition to distribution, including banking,
insurance and telecommunications. Also liberalized are professional services
such as accountancy and legal consulting, business and computer-related
services, and audio-visual recording services. China would also take on the
See the remark of Peter B. Hale, Acting Assistant secretary, US Department of
Commerce, “PNTR/WTO: A Good Deal for US Small Businesses in China,” US
Senate Committee on Small Business, March 7, 2000.
36
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obligations contained in the Basic Telecommunications and Financial Services
Agreements.

• Agriculture
The WTO accession bilateral agreement provided increased access for US
agricultural exports across a broad range of commodities and eliminated nontariff barriers that had kept US farmers out of this huge market. On US priority
agricultural products, tariffs would drop from an average of 31 percent to 14
percent by January 2004, with even sharper drops for beef, poultry, pork, cheese
and other commodities. China would also create new tariff rate quotas that would
significantly expand export opportunities for US wheat, corn, rice and other bulk
commodities farmers. US exporters would also gain the right to sell virtually all
products freely inside China without going through state trading enterprises or
other middlemen. According to William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce, China
would account for nearly 40 percent of the growth of US agricultural exports. 38
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In 2000 (before PNTR agreement), China prohibited foreign firms from
distributing imported products or providing after-sale services such as repair and
maintenance, unless they had invested in China.
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See ‘Testimony of William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce, regarding PNTR
for China before the Senate Commerce, science and Transportation Committee,”
on April 11,
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• Technology
China would offer tremendous opportunities for US firms in sectors like
information technologies; environmental technologies; housing and construction;
energy equipment; services such as franchising; food processing and packaging;
and many more. China’s purchases of IT hardware, software, and services
should exceed $ 14 billion in 2000-- and triple that year’s level by 2004. The most
important share of China’s IT spending had been going to hardware, but the US
expected the proportion of software and IT services to increase significantly over
the next few years. Internet use in China had been becoming more widespread
and it was going to grow faster there than any other nations in Asian-Pacific
nations. In fact, the numbers of Chinese internet users was expected to increase
by over 50 percent annually.

39

E-businesses in China were multiplying almost as

rapidly as internet users.
Environmental technology exports was an important sector for US
commerce. China faced some of the most significant environmental challenges in
the world, including contaminated water, poor air quality, a deteriorating natural
resource base, dense population, and heavy reliance on soft coal for energy
production. Imports of environmental goods in China were $ 5.5 billion in 1999.
According to US Commerce Department, Environmental technology exports had
more than doubled its exports since 1993. With PNTR, the Department of
Commerce expected to double them again in the next five years.

“Remarks of Michael J. Copps, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade
Development” 2000.
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Rules-based Trade, International Cooperation, and International Regime

David Aaron emphasized the importance of a rules-based relationship
which brings predictability into trade environment.
He said,
China’s trade barriers remain high, its business infrastructure is
antiquated, and as a result American businesses are blocked in many
ways from one of the world’s largest markets....
PNTR agreement would help clear the way for China’s entry
into the WTO and rules based trade. For the first time, many of China’s
most important agreements would be under review by an international
body. It means China concedes that government cannot behave
arbitrarily at home or abroad and that government actions can be
subject to international rules. It would also significantly improve the
business environment within China....
Concepts and ideas like the rule of law, transparency,
predictability, respect for environment, and market access clearly
moving China, and our overall economic dialogue, in a more positive
direction. I believe the most important challenge in our relationship is to
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encourage China’s leadership to base its reform efforts on these
concepts....
Cooperating on IPR enforcement, pressing forward on greater
market access and transparency, and collaborating on commercial
projects helped sustain a continuing dialogue.40

The White House fact sheet on China NTR (1998) also emphasized the
importance of compliance to rules, regulations, and international regimes for the
trade relationship with China.
It argued,

China’s adherence to international rules advances the interests of
the American people. On nonproliferation, China has joined us in the
NPT, CTBT, CWC, and BWC regimes, committed to no new nuclear
assistance to Iran, joined a major international nuclear suppliers group,
the Zangger Committee, and put into place comprehensive nuclear
exports controls. We have a strong bilateral program to combat alien
smuggling, narcotics trafficking and terrorism, and are working with
China to meet environmental challenges. MFN (NTR) extension

40

“Remarks of Ambassador David L. Aaron: Keynote Address to the Economic
Strategy Institute’s Panel on China/PNTR” Washington D.C., March 2, 2000.
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supports our efforts to subject China to the same international
disciplines as other major powers and builds cooperation.41

Conflicting Claims about PNTR outside the Administration

There had been several conflicting claims about PNTR in terms of 1)
national security and 2) human rights issues.

National Security

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a fact sheet (September
6, 2000) that warns against granting China PNTR status with regard to the US
national security. According to this fact sheet, rewarding Beijing with PNTR will
encourage continued belligerence.
According to the fact sheet,

Granting PNTR to the People’s Republic of China will diminish, not
enhance US national security interests in Asia. Over the past year, the
PRC has stepped up its threats against Taiwan, continued to proliferate
weapons technologies to rogue states, consolidated its military

41

White House Fact Sheet on China NTR, (June 3, 1998)
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presence on islets that lie within pacific maritime boundary and
broached the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the US....
Granting PNTR to China encourages this belligerence and
sends the signal that the US is not serious about protecting its national
security interests in Asia. This signal will only embolden the hard line
leadership in Beijing and encourage aggressive behavior.42

On February 28, 2000, a commentary in the official newspaper of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stated that China was prepared to use longrange missiles against the United States in the event that the US intervened in a
conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.43
A special edition of the Haowangjiao Weekly, another PLA sponsored
publication, was more explicit in its threats. The 16 page special issue outlined
possible strategies in the event of a military confrontation over Taiwan. The
strategies included a neutron bomb attack against Taiwan and nuclear blackmail
against the US.44
According to the CIA’s August 9, 2000 report to Congress on proliferation,
the PRC stepped up its proliferation of weapons technology in the last half on
1999. “Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during
this reporting period,” the report stated. “In addition, firms in China provided

Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, The
Department of State (http://usinfo.state.gov).
43
Reported in the Washington Times February 29, 2000.
44
Reported by Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service March 21, 2000.
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missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several countries of
proliferation concern-- such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya.”45
China had increased its military budget by double digit percentages for more
than a decade; this surge in military spending, subsidized by the US trade deficit
with China, had been used to purchase advanced Russian and other weaponry
including fighter aircraft, submarines, and the deadly ship-to-ship missile, which
was specifically designed to attack US aircraft carrier groups.

Human Rights

With the issue of PNTR, the administration officials tried to ignore human
rights issues or delink these issues from their supports for PNTR. The theoretical
implication of ‘Issue-delinkage’ will be discussed later.
William Daley’s remarks show how the Clinton Administration treated the
issue of human rights with regard to PNTR:

The President has made clear that supporting China’s accession
into the WTO does not mean a tacit endorsement of China’s human
rights policies. We will continue to denounce China’s persecution of its
citizens for their political or religious beliefs. In March, Secretary of
State Albright demonstrated this commitment when she personally

45

Report available on the web at
(http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_aug2000.htm).
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presented a resolution condemning China’s human rights record to the
United Nations’ Human Rights Commission in Geneva. We will not
hesitate to use our authority to sanction China under the International
Religious Freedom Act as we did last year. We will also continue to
pursue our foreign policy goals with China in a number of important
areas such as non-proliferation and global climate change. We remain
committed to a peaceful resolution of issues between China and
Taiwan.... Of course, the trade agreement with China will not, by itself,
resolve serious human rights issues in China.46

3. Theoretical Implications

In this section, six major theoretical implications around the issues of MD
and PNTR will be discussed with regard to the linkage between the sense of
threat from the world system and the decision-maker’s choices.

The Medium Sense of Threat

Although the US has attained high relative security in this post-cold war
world, the Clinton administration was not free from the long-term concern of
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“Testimony of William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce, regarding PNTR for
China before the Senate Commerce, science and Transportation Committee,” on
April 11, 2000.
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future strategic rival such as China which might bring a new balance of power in
the twenty first century.
Given the rate of economic growth in the last two decades, the RAND
Corporation projected that China’s economic output will surpass that of the
United States -- $11.3 trillion to $10.7 trillion-- in the year 2010. China has also
chosen to use some of its new wealth to strengthen its armed force. Indeed,
since the end of the Cold War, China has been the only great power to increase
its defense expenditures (as a percent of its gross domestic product). Its military
expenditures have also increased at a rapid rate since 1990.47 Although China’s
nominal defense budget was only $9.7 billion in 1996, most analysts believe a
more accurate reading would place it between $38 billion and $90 billion. As the
last large Communist country and the world’s most populous, China inspired fear
in many quarters of the US.
Some also see a new aggressiveness on the part of China in its missile
tests directed toward Taiwan, its use of force in disputed islands in the South
China Sea, and its sales of nuclear technology to Pakistan and possibly to Iran
and Iraq. Based on this military data and recent actions, Richard Bernstein and
Ross Munro (1997) concluded in a book entitles The Coming Conflict with China:
“With the largest army, navy, and air force in Asia, China spends more (on its
military) than any of its neighbors, with the possible exception of Japan.”48
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China’s defense budget has grown by 12 to 13 percent per year since 1990.
Bernstein, Richard and Ross Munro, 1997, The Coming Conflict with China,
New York: A.A. Knopf.
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On the other hand, China remained one of the poorest nations in the world
and the largest recipient of World Bank aid, although its economic growth is the
envy of every developing country in the world. China’s military budget was about
one-fifth that of the United States and smaller and much less sophisticated than
Japan’s. Indeed, Beijing’s recent military purchases would allow China to enter
the 21st century incorporating technologies from the 1970s and 1980s developed
by Russia and Israel. China does not have an aircraft carrier, and the People’s
Liberation Army was called ‘one of the world’s largest military museums.’ It
retains the world’s largest standing army, but it has very limited capacity to
project force beyond its own borders.
With the exception of the Taiwan issue, China’s new strength is much less
of a problem for the US than is China’s future dominance.
In his speech at the United States Institute of Peace, Clinton stated:

We all know it’s an extraordinary moment when there is no
overriding threat to our security, when no great power need to feel that
any other is a military threat, when freedom is expanding, and open
markets and technology are raising living standards on every continent,
bringing the world closer together in countless way.
The United States, as the largest and strongest country in the
word at this moment-- largest in economic terms and military terms-has the unavoidable responsibility to lead in this increasingly
interdependent world, to try to help meet the challenges of this new
106

era.... Clearly, our first challenge is to build a more peaceful world....
The second challenge is that of bringing our former adversaries Russia
and China into the international system as open, prosperous, and
stable nations... Now we hear that China is a country to be feared. A
growing number of people say that it is the next great threat to our
security and our well-being.... What about this argument? Well, those
who say it point out, factually, that if China’s economy continues to
grow on its present trajectory, it will be the world’s largest in the next
century.... They urge us therefore, to contain China, to deny it access to
our markets, our technology, our investment, and to bolster the strength
of our allies in Asia to counter the threat a strong China will pose in the
twenty-first century.... The issue is how to respond to this. I believe we
should not look at China through rose-colored glasses, nor should we
look through a glass darkly to see an image that distorts China’s
strength and ignores its complexity. (Emphases added).49

In summation, China’s long-term modernization and expansion of its
strategic nuclear forces have made US strategic analysts perceive China as a
latent threat. Although China’s nuclear force will remain relatively small, and the
U.S. will retain a massive retaliation deterrent, China’s nuclear capabilities are a
meaningful coercive instrument.
Clinton, Bill. 2000, “Speech at the United States Institute of Peace,
Washington DC, April 7, 1999” in Clinton Policy Reader, Edited by Alvin
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Absolute Gains Vs. Relative Gains

Many documents suggest the possibility that China would emerge as a
strategic rival and US preeminence would be balanced in the long run.50
Alternatively, the US could take advantage of the high relative security it currently
enjoys by developing a new MD plan and enhancing US global leadership. The
MD would increase American military power enormously. In interviews and
official statements, Chinese leaders categorically state, “US missile defense
would upset the world strategic balance.”51 In their joint statement, President
Jiang Zemin and President Vladimir Putin charged the US with “seeking unilateral
military and security advantages.”52
It will take a long time for North Korea to acquire a realistic long-range
ballistic missile capacity. Therefore, this fact lends credibility to Chinese charges
that the US exaggerates the threat of North Korean missiles to justify TMD
capabilities really meant to confront China. Indeed, many US TMD supporters
acknowledge that the US should and would proceed with TMD development in
East Asia, even in the absence of a North Korean missile threat. The justification
for this approach comes from continuing US reliance on extended nuclear
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deterrence to guarantee Japanese security -- the ‘nuclear umbrella.’ Advocates
of joint US-Japan TMD development often cite its crucial role in reaffirming US
commitment to this alliance, particularly as enhanced under the new security
guidelines.
Beijing perceives deployment of TMD in East Asia as a challenge to China’s
capabilities to pursue legitimate interests in its geographic region. This concern
by no means applies exclusively with respect to Taiwan. If that issue were in
some way resolved, China would still look upon the TMD development both as a
signal that US and Japanese long-term intentions in East Asia are confrontational
rather than collaborative and as a portent of a US containment policy aimed at
China.
On the other hand, the issue of the PNTR agreement provides an example
of absolute gains pursuit focused on economic benefits and decreased risk from
predictable trade environment within international regimes such as WTO. To US
officials, PNTR was described as a reciprocal trading arrangement between two
countries. It was not a favor one country does for another. It was mutually
beneficial.
According to David Aaron,

PNTR and China WTO accession represent a rare ‘win’ ‘win’
situation for the US, China, the global trading system, American small
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businesses, and the world. Congress should move forward and pass
PNTR for China to ensure that this historic opportunity is not lost.53

To China, entering into the PNTR agreement was very important, because
it was a prior step before being a member of WTO, and international regime.
This agreement would make the US decrease the risk of unpredictability in its
trade relationship with China.

International Regime Vs. Hegemonic Stability

The key concepts for neoliberalism include treaties, rule of law,
predictability, transparency, cooperation, peaceful partner, mutual benefits, and
international regime, as well as absolute gains. The case of the PNTR agreement
clearly shows how administration officials emphasized and even exaggerated the
vision of peaceful partnership with China in terms of rules-based trade within
WTO, an international regime.
On the other hand, the case of MD shows how administration officials tried to
modify or defy the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, a current arms control tool,
to build new defense system with a realist perspective. Ever since Richard Nixon
and Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty in 1972, it has been a cornerstone

This keynote address, “PNTR and WTO accession for China: Good for the US
and Good for American Small Businesses,” was presented at the Economic
Strategy Institute, Washington DC, March 2, 2000.
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of arms control. Its fundamental premise, which held throughout the Cold War,
was that limiting missile defenses limited offensive missiles.
The Pentagon announced (January, 1999) that the threat of a missile strike
from a rogue state like North Korea, Iraq, or Iran, justified building a limited
national missile defense system-- something explicitly prohibited by the ABM
treaty.
While insisting the United States was not abandoning the treaty’s basic
aims, the Clinton administration said it wanted to start negotiations with the
Russians to amend the treaty in ways that would reflect the emergence of
troubling new threats in a troubling new world.
Defense Secretary William Cohen even suggested the new threats had
become so great that the United States would reserve its right to withdraw from
the treaty unilaterally if the Russians refused to consider amendments. While the
White House later insisted his remarks were interpreted too harshly, it was clear
that the rules that have governed arms control for a quarter century had
changed.
“Some of the orthodoxy that has driven our policy in the Cold War needs
to be rethought in a world that is much more complex, that has many and varied
threats and that in many ways is much less stable that the Cold War standoff that
created the orthodoxy,” said James Rubin, the State Department’s spokesman,
who has an extensive background in arms control.54
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Myers, Steven. 1999. “Missile Defense: Rethinking a Treaty for a New Kind of
Enemy,” The New York Times, January 24, 1999.
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The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty strictly limited the number, type, and
placement of missiles that the US or the Soviet Union could deploy to shoot
down incoming nuclear missiles. In the strange logic of nuclear warfare, officials
believed that creating national missile defenses would upset the strategic
balance by encouraging the other side to build more offensive weapons to
overwhelm the defenses. William Cohen, who announced that the Pentagon had
planned to spend $ 10.5 billion over six years developing a missile defense, said
that logic still held in 1999.
However, he and others argued they believed the treaty had enough
flexibility to allow for the sort of limited national missile defense. A limited
defense, they said, need not upset the strategic balance of power with the
Russians since the threats it aims to counter lie elsewhere-- a notion very close
to heresy for arms controllers of the Cold War era.
Far from being reassured, the Russians reacted sharply to the
administration’s announcement. China, too, joined in criticizing the US, declaring
that a missile defense would only undermine security and stimulate the
proliferation of missiles.
Although there were enormous fiscal and technological obstacles, the
national missile defense plan shows that the thinking about arms control has
evolved as the world system has changed.55
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Joseph Cirincione, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, an advocacy group in Washington D.C., said he had
profound doubts about the Pentagon’s plans, but believed that arms control
treaties should not be impervious to change.
He said,

We are in a period where we should be willing to rethink our
treaties.... I don’t think there is anything wrong with the United States
saying, if the conditions warrant it, we should consider changing it. It
should be a living document. 56

In sum, the US tried to modify or defy the ABM treaty, which is the current
international regime for arms control, when it perceived the world system had
changed. The realist perspective gains explanatory power to deal with various
strategic concerns such as balance of power and uncertainty of the twenty-first
century with regard to the ABM treaty.
On the contrary, the case of the PNTR agreement could be well explained
by neoliberalism focusing on the importance of treaty, international regime, rules
and regulations, which bring predictability among states. Cooperation is another
important key word for the PNTR case. One administration official said, “We
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need to cooperate with one another on those areas where we have common
interests.”57

Long-term Gains Vs. Short-term Gains

By 2015, China is likely to have more advanced missiles capable of targeting
the US, including a few more survivable land-and-sea-based mobile missiles with
smaller nuclear warheads -- in part influenced by US technology gained though
espionage. China tested its first mobile ICBM in August 1999. 58
In September 1999, the National Intelligence Council examined future
capability for China and some other countries that have or have had ballistic
missiles or space launch vehicles (SLV) programs or intentions to pursue such a
program. Using intelligence information and expertise from inside or outside the
Intelligence Community, they projected possible and likely missile developments
by 2015.
According to this report, Chinese strategic nuclear doctrine calls for a
survivable long-range missile force that can hold a significant portion of the US
population at risk in a retaliatory strike. They argued that China’s new ICBMs
would be able to target the US from launch areas near China.

“Remarks of Ambassador David L. Aaron: Keynote Address to the Economic
Strategy Institute’s Panel on China/PNTR” Washington D.C., March 2, 2000.
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As we see the data from the National Intelligence Council and other
various documents, such as the Rumsfeld report, the Welch report, and the Cox
report, the development of MD had been based on long-term vision of the relative
security.
The proposed MD plan could achieve an unbelievably high interception
rate (90 percent) of China’s strategic weapons. If China responds by simply
increasing its arsenal by nine times, that might cost the equivalent of about a few
billion dollars over a span of 10-20 years to retain the same level of deterrence. It
would not be easy for China’s economy to absorb that cost.
On the other hand, various speeches and documents on the PNTR
agreement had emphasized short-to-medium term absolute gains estimated on
the basis of the next 3-5 years.
William Daley’s remark shows one of these efforts to emphasize shortterm absolute gains.
China has agreed to begin opening its markets in virtually every
sector immediately upon (WTO) accession. The phase-in of further
concessions will be limited to five years in almost all cases, and in
many cases only one to three years.59
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Although RAND Corporation data shows that China’s economic outputs will
surpass that of the US in the year of 2010, this data based on long-term relative
gains was not mentioned by any administration officials supporting PNTR.

Issue Delinkage

Another theoretical implication from these cases is issue delinkage, which
is related to the medium sense of threat from the world environment. As pointed
out above, we could observe the mixed pattern of cooperation and rivalry over
the past 4-5 years in which Chinese and US leaders work feverishly, and amid
considerable tension, to separate issues and prevent problems from infecting
points of cooperation.
This situation requires a US approach that explicitly stresses ‘issue
delinkage’-- a painstaking and skillful effort to delink Taiwan and other security
issues from issues around that globe what are of vital trade interests to the
United States. According to Evan Feigenbaum, the Clinton administration opted
for linkage between trade and human rights policies in 1993, then reversed its
approach in 1994-95.60
To defend against US power, China was trying desperately to build its
missile capacity, strengthen alliances with old rivals like Russia, forge new
friendships with rogue states, clamp down on dissent, and threaten Taiwan. Each
Feigenbaum, Evan. 2001, “China’s Challenge to Pax Americana,” The
Washington Quarterly 24.3: 31-43.
60
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of these actions merely confirms American hard-liners’ negative views on China.
Donald Rumsfeld said, “we can’t engage in self-delusion. The (Chinese) are not
strategic partners in my view.”61 Realists favored constructing a National Missile
Defense (NMD) system, criticizing China’s human rights record.
With the issue of PNTR, however, the administration officials ignored or
delinked human rights issues from the relationship between the US and China. In
summation, the United States had found it exceedingly difficult to forge a unified
and coherent policy toward China. There had been various mixed signals that the
Clinton administration sent to China with regard to security, human rights and
trade issues.

Personality Vs. the Role of the Decision-maker

During the 1992 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Bill Clinton
repeatedly attacked President George Bush for his policy toward China. He
charged that Bush continues to coddle aging rulers with undisguised contempt
for democracy, human rights, and the need to control the spread of dangerous
technologies (Auger, 1995).62 Aligning himself with a large bipartisan majority in
the Congress and with US public opinion, Clinton specifically criticized Bush’s
willingness to renew unconditionally China’s ‘Most-Favored-Nation’ (MFN) trading
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status. Clinton argued that Chinese access to the US market should be
contingent on the Chinese government’s willingness to abide by international
standards for human rights, fair trading practices, and nuclear non-proliferation,
linkages the Bush administration had persistently refused to make on the
grounds that such conditionality was unlikely to be effective in achieving those
goals and would hurt other US interests.
Five months after taking office, Clinton and his advisers confronted this
same choice. Clinton, however, quickly backed away from his original stance, as
he came to appreciate the importance of national interests from the relationship
with China. He embraced Bush’s pragmatic approach, though with a better
political gloss: “We are developing,” Clinton explained, “a broader engagement
with the People’s Republic of China that will encompass both our economic and
strategic interests. That policy is best reflected in our decision to delink China’s
Most-Favored-Nation status from its record on human rights”(emphasis added).63
According

to

Evan

Feigenbaum

(Feigenbaum

2001),

the

Clinton

administration tried to opt for linkage between trade and human rights policies,
but finally reversed its approach after 1994. 64
Since normalization of relations in 1979, the US has pursed two policies
with regard to China: a presidential policy that has sought to find a balanced
calculation of their various strategic and economic interests, and a congressional
63
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policy that has aimed to protect Taiwan and to assert specific American interests
in human and religious rights. This two-track policy has continued no matter
which party has controlled the White House or Congress. Therefore, it is not
difficult to understand President Clinton’s changed approach to the linkage
between human rights issue and China’s MFN (NTR) status.

4. Conclusion

As discussed above, this chapter examines various theoretical implications
from the cases of MD and PNTR. The major theoretical implications of the cases
of MD and PNTR can be summarized in the following TABLE 6-1.

In sum, the case of MD shows how the Clinton administration pursued longterm relative gains around security issues. On the contrary, the Clinton
administration supported PNTR which might bring various short-term absolute
economic gains from the trade relationship with China in the same time period.
Although there was no existence of the strategic enemy which might drastically
change the status quo during 1998-2000, the Clinton administration was fully
aware of China’s development of military capacity including ICBMs which might
bring a significant challenge to the US hegemony in the long run. Since national
security was the most vital part of national interests, the decision-maker’s gains
calculations largely focused on relative gains. However, the medium sense of
64
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threat also allowed the decision-maker flexibility to pursue various economic
gains from trade relationships based on international regimes. The case of PNTR
is a good example to support the above argument. These two-track policies of
the Clinton administration brought various outside opinions about long-term or
short-term gains, or the range of the concept of national interest in both security
and economic areas with diffused issues. Security issues were easily delinked
from economic issues during 1998-2000, because the medium sense of threat
enabled the Clinton administration to pursue both relative and absolute gains
from two different issue areas.
The cases of MD and PNTR also allow us more flexibility to apply both
realism and neoliberalism during the same time period. The major premises of
realism -- uncertainty, conflict, security dilemma, and relative gains -- fit well
into the case of MD. On the other hand, neoliberalism has a powerful explanatory
force regarding the case of PNTR in terms of international regime, cooperation,
predictability, and absolute gains.

Quarterly 24.3: 31-43.
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Chapter VII
Conclusion

As a challenge to the mainstream discourse of international relations in
terms of the world system and the decision-maker’s pursuit of gains, this study
has examined several cases from the US and China. With each different notion
of anarchy in the world system, and theoretical assumptions about cooperation
and

conflict,

two

major

frameworks,

realism

and

neoliberalism,

have

dichotomized interpretations of the decision-maker’s pursuit of gains. Realism
emphasizes the fixed nature of anarchy in the world system, which causes
endless arms races under a security dilemma. As Joseph Grieco pointed out,
relative gains pursuit around the issue of security has been emphasized as a
main theoretical mechanism of foreign policy decision-making.
By explaining anarchy as an invariable constant of the world system,
however, the simplified theoretical framework of realism loses explanatory power
about the level of anarchy which might correspond with the decision-maker’s
sense of threat.
As an alternative to realism, neoliberalism has tried to offer a more flexible
notion of anarchy by introducing the notion of international regime into the world
environment. With international regimes, the interaction among states is more
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predictable. To the neoliberal, the fundamental goal of the decision-maker is to
attain the highest possible gains or payoffs. Therefore, the decision-maker’s
pursuit of absolute gains has become the main theoretical mechanism for
neoliberals.
Neither traditional frameworks have been able to offer an explanation for
the interaction between the dynamics of the world system and the changeable
priorities of national interests with the short-term or long-term estimation of gains.
Unlike past literature providing fixed and dichotomized explanations of the
decision-maker’s pursuit of gains, this dissertation has shown that gains pursuit
based on the hierarchy of international interests can be seriously affected by the
external environment. The external environment which forms the decisionmaker’s sense of threat leads the decision-maker to pursue either absolute or
relative gains. In other words, gains pursuit corresponds with the dynamics of the
world environment.
When the sense of threat from the world environment is high, the
decision-maker tries to gain equilibrium in power in the world environment and to
escape from an existing unfavorable situation. As a result, the decision-maker
tries to change the status quo through relative gains pursuit. Because security is
the most vital issue when the sense of the threat from the world environment is
high, other international issues, such as human rights and trade, could be
connected with security issues by policies like sanctions or bargaining. The case
of the last two years of the Carter administration, and the case of Mao in China
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have shown how the decision-maker reacts by calculating or addressing relative
gains under the higher sense of threat.
On the other hand, a low sense of threat from the world environment
could make the decision-maker try to keep this favorable status quo and focus
more on economic gains coming from cooperation and compliance to rules and
values through international regime and absolute gains pursuit. The case of the
first two years of the Carter administration and the case of Deng have shown
how the decision-maker reacts by pursuing absolute gains under the low sense
of threat.
The cases of MD and PNTR have been good examples to explain the
choices of the decision-maker under a medium sense of threat. The Clinton
administration’s policy toward China indicates mixed patterns of cooperation and
conflict during 1998-2000. Both absolute and relative gains were pursued by the
administration in this period.
Without having a strategic enemy, the US would be able to focus on
long-term missile defense plan for the protection from possible missile attacks
from rogue states and China in the future. At the same time, absolute economic
benefits from the trade relationship with China were emphasized by President
Clinton and other administration officials. Security issues appeared to be delinked
from economic issues during this period.
The cases used for this dissertation can be illustrated in the following
FIGURE 7-1.
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The case of the Carter administration explains how the same decisionmaker’s policy can be changed depending on the world environment. The Carter
administration started with détente in relations with the Soviet Union. Kissinger
had tried to contain Soviet power by co-opting the USSR into a concert of great
powers during 1969-1976. As Forsythe (1989) said, this restyled ‘Congress of
Vienna’ was to bring both the USSR and China fully into the international system,
and therefore give them a vested interest in stabilizing, not overturning that
system. Nixon’s China initiative and his coordinated effort to achieve détente in
relations with the USSR and China provided a significant ground for the start of
the Carter administration. The low sense of threat from a balanced détente
system allowed Carter to pursue absolute gains and compliance with rules,
norms, and regulations of international organizations and thus to maintain the
existing international regime, as well as to advocate international activism within
the UN context. During Carter’s last two years in office, however, the world
environment dramatically changed. Under increased tension, Carter failed to
reconcile US security interests and his progressive position. The Carter
administration’s foreign policy moved from the progressive position to the realist
position. The concept of national interest became narrower and more focused on
security areas. Therefore, various issues around national interests became
conglomerated around security issues.

During Mao’s era, the world environment was highly unstable and
complicated. On the other hand, the world environment based on the relationship
124

between the US and the USSR could be characterized as détente. Mao’s pursuit
of relative gains was well expressed in his ‘anti-hegemonism’ in reaction to the
unstable environment around China.
On the other hand, the more settled environment around China during
Deng’s era allowed China to develop a long-term economic modernization
program with ‘practical independent diplomatic doctrine.’ With the low sense of
threat from the environment, Deng pursed long-term absolute economic gains.
Personalities of decision-makers were not significant for these cases, because
Deng emphasized the importance of Mao’s ‘anti-hegemonism’ and reinforced
the application of that doctrine in the early years of his reign.

The cases of MD and PNTR have shown how relative and absolute
gains could be pursued at the same time under a medium sense of threat.
Although there was no significant military tension during 1998-2000, the Clinton
administration was aware of the latent threat from rapidly developing China. As
Condoleezza Rice said, China was not a ‘status quo power’ to the US.65 Security
issues based on long-term relative gains were delinked from economic issues
based on short-term absolute gains in these cases of MD and PNTR.

In sum, the sense of threat is a key element to understand the mechanism
between the world environment and the decision-maker’s foreign policy choices

65

Rice, Condoleezza. 2000, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs
79:56.
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based on gains pursuit. Because the method used for this research is the smallN qualitative method, the problem of external validity (generalizability) is the
major shortcoming of this study. Therefore, more detailed synthetic and systemic
approaches to the dynamics of the world system with various cases are needed
for a comprehensive understanding of policy choices, and the further
development of the study in the area of international relations.
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Table 2-1
The Difference of Major Positions between Realism and Neoliberalism
Realism
Notion of Anarchy
State as......
Gains Problem
On international cooperation

Neoliberalism

Lack of common
government
Defensive positionalists

No authority to prevent
others from using violence
Rational Egoists

Relative Gains

Absolute Gains

Pessimistic

Optimistic
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Table 3-1
The World Environment as Independent Variables (X)

B

TENSION

TENSION DÉTENTE

A

EQUILIBRIA

BALANCED
TENSION

BALANCED
TENSION
REDUCTION

EQUILIBRIAUNBALANCE

UNBALANCE

UNBALANCE EQUILIBRIA

UNBALANCE
ORIENTED
TENSION

UNBALANCED
TENSION

BALANCE
ORIENTED
TENSION

UNBALANCE
ORIENTED
TENSION
REDUCTION

DÉTENTE

BALANCED
DÉTENTE

UNBALANCE
ORIENTED
DÉTENTE

DÉTENTE TENSION

BALANCED
TENSION
INCREASE

UNBALANCE
ORIENTED
TENSION
INCREASE
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UNBALANCED
TENSION
REDUCTION

BALANCE
ORIENTED
TENSION
REDUCTION

UNBALANCED
DÉTENTE

BALANCE
ORIENTED
DETENTE

UNBALANCED
TENSION
INCREASE

BALANCE
ORIENTED
TENSION
INCREASE

Table 6-1
The difference of major factors between the MD plan and the PNTR agreement

MD
Major Issue

Security

Focus on...

Security Dilemma
Uncertainty
Conflict

Time Range

Long-term

Gains Pursuit
China as...
Theoretical Framework

Relative Gains

PNTR
Economy/Rules-based
Trade
Stability
Predictability
Cooperation
Short-term
Absolute Gains

Latent Threat
Future Enemy/Rival

Economic Partner

Realism/Structural Realism

Neoliberalism
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responsible to:
their own citizens

community beyond
international borders

promote:
nationalist
national
ideal

universal
ideal

exceptionalist

(1)

(2)

progressive

radical progressive

(3)

(4)

Figure 2-1
Cingranelli’s typology concerning decision-makers’ moral positions
(Source: Cingranelli, David. 1992, Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third
World, New York, St. Martin’s Press, page 6)

145

responsible to:

their own citizens

community beyond
international borders

promote:
Taft
Hardling
Coolidge
Hoover

nationalist
national ideal
Eisenhower
Johnson
Nixon/Ford
F. D. Roosevelt
Reagan
Bush
universal ideal

Mckinley
T. Roosevelt

exceptionalist

Wilson

progressive

radical progressive

Truman
Kennedy
Carter

Figure 2-2
Cingranelli’s evaluations concerning the moral positions
of the full set of US presidents in the twentieth century.
(Source: Cingranelli, D. (1992) Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World.
New York, St. Martin’s Press, page 17)
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BALANCE

Balanced Détente System

Balanced Tensions System

DÉTENTE

TENSION
Unbalanced Détente System

Unbalanced Tensions System

UNBALANCE

Figure 3-1
The world environment as independent variables
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Level of Issue
Conglomeration

Sense of Threat

Figure 3-2
The relationship between the level of issue conglomeration and the sense of
threat
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Carter I

X1

Carter II X2

----- ------

-----------

Influence
Lower Sense of Threat
Broader Concept of N.I.
Wider Range of Reconciliation

Security
Higher Sense of Threat
Narrow Concept of N.I.
Narrow Range of Reconciliation between
H.R. and Other Goals

-------------

Y1
Absolute Gains

-------------

Y2

Relative Gains

Figure 3-3
The relationship between the world system and gains pursuit in the case of the
Carter administration
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--------X1------------------------------------- X2-----------------------The world
environment I

1976

Change of the world
environment II
Carter I

1980

Carter II

Figure 4-1
The change in the world environment as an independent variable

World Environment---- Changed Priority of National Interests ---- Foreign Policy around Human Rights
(influence --- security)
compliance
Changed Size of Overlapping Areas
(wide --- narrow)

(absolute gains ----- relative gains)
(Neoliberalism ----- Realism)

Changed Range of the Concept of
National Interests
(broad --- narrow)

Figure 4-2
The mechanism of gains pursuit with regard to the world environment
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Mao X1

-----------

Security
Higher Sense of Threat

-------------

Y1
Relative Gains

Deng

X2

----- ------

Economic development
Lower Sense of Threat

-------------

Y2
Absolute Gains

Figure 5-1
The relationship between the world system and gains pursuit in the cases of China

Carter I

BALANCE

Deng

Balanced Détente System

Balanced Tensions System

DÉTENTE

TENSION
Unbalanced Détente System
Clinton

Unbalanced Tensions System

Mao

Carter II
UNBALANCE

Figure 7-1
The relationships between the world environment and decision-makers’ foreign
policy
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